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POLICE DETENTION AND ARREST PRIVILEGES UNDER FOREIGN LAW
A. Canada*
G. ARTHUR MARTIN**
whom he finds committing an indictable offence."
In general
Section 435 deals with power of a peace officer
The powers of a peace officer to arrest for sus- to arrest without warrant and reads as follows:
pected violations or suspected potential violations
"A peace officer may arrest without warrant
of the criminal law are to be found in the Criminal
(a) A person who has committed or who, on
Code of Canada, 2 or in Provincial enactments
reasonable and probable grounds he believes
creating Provincial offences. The common law
has committed or is about to commit an
distinction between felonies and misdemeanours
indictable offence, or
has been abolished. Crimes are designated simply
(b) A person whom he finds committing a &imias indictable offences (i.e., offences which may
nal offence."
be tried by indictment) and offences (i.e., less
Criminal offence in subsection (b) means any
serious types of crimes which are triable by a offence punishable on indictment or upon smumary
Magistrate or Justice of the Peace under a special conviction under the Criminal Code or any Docode of procedure set out in Part XXIV of the minion Statute but does not include a violation
4
Code).3
of a Provincial Statute.
The Criminal Code empowers both the peace
There are certain other sections dealing with
officer and the ordinary citizen to arrest without the power of the citizen to arrest in certain cirwarrant in certain circumstances, the powers of cumstances. Section 30 authorizes every person
the peace officer being wider than those of the who witnesses a breach to detain any person who
citizen. Section 434 of the Code relates to the commits or is about to join in or to renew the
powers of the citizen and reads as follows:
breach of the-peace, for the purpose of giving him
"Anyone may arrest without warrant a person in custody to a police officer. Section 436 provides
* A brief discussion of the Canadian federal system, that anyone may arrest without warrant a person
which may be helpful in better understanding certain who on reasonable and probable grounds he beVortions of this paper, appears in 51 J. CRim. L., C. & lieves has committed a criminal offence and is
S.161-63 (1960).-ED.
**Member of the bars of British Columbia and escaping therefrom and is freshly pursued by
Ontario with offices in Toronto. Additional biographical persons who have a lawful authority to arrest
data may be found in 51 J.Calm. L., C. & P. . 161 that person. Section 437 empowers the owner or
(1960).
any person in lawful possession of any property
1The subject of arrest under a warrant is not discussed in this report. Section 440 of the Criminal Code or any person authorized by the owner or any
provides that the Justice, upon an Information under person in lawful possession of property to arrest
oath, may issue a warrant or a summons to compel the
without warrant a person whom he finds commitattendance of the accused before him.
2 1953-54 (CAN.) c.51; Frey v. Fedoruk, [1950] S.C.R. ting a criminal offence on or in relation to that
517.
property.
3 Section 28 of The Interpretation Act, R.S.C.,
c.158 (1952), provides:
"(1) Every Act shall be read and construed as if Powers of the Police Officer
any offence for which the offender may be
Section 435, in its present form, was first en(a) prosecuted by indictment, howsoever such
offence may be therein described or re- acted in 1955 and was derived in part from the
ferred to, were described or referred to as an former Section 652, 5 which reads as follows:
indictable offence;
"Any peace officer may, without a warrant,
(b) punishable on summary conviction, were
described or referred to as an offence; and all
4 CRANKSHAWS CRIMINAL CODE OF CANADA 595
prOVisions of the Criminal Code relating to
indictable offences, or offences, as the case (7th ed.).
5R.S.C., c.36 (1927).
may be, shall apply to every such offence."
PowERs OF ARREST'
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take into custody any person whom he finds
lying or loitering in any highway, yard or
other place during the night, and whom he has
good cause to suspect of having committed or
being about to commit, any indictable offence,
and may detain such person until he can be
brought before a justice to be dealt with according to law.
"(2) No person who has been so apprehended shall be detained after noon of the following day without being brought before a
justice."
Section 435 in its present form gives the police
officer much wider powers than were enjoyed by
him at common law. The power to arrest one
whom he on reasonable and probable grounds
believes to be about to commit an indictable offence
obviously enables the officer to intervene at a
stage prior to the commission of an attempt. The
attempt to commit an indictable offence is itself
an indictable offence and an attempt to commit
an offence punishable on summary conviction
only is a summary conviction offence. 6 Since by
Section 435 a peace officer has the power to arrest
any person whom he finds committing a criminal
offence, it is clear he could justify arresting a
person attempting to commit any criminal offence
by the power there conferred, and the power to
arrest a person whom he believes "is about to
commit an indictable offence" would be unnecessary if this power were construed as being limited
to situations where an attempt to commit an
offence has already begun. It follows that a police
officer may arrest under Section 435 where he believes the person arrested is about to commit an
indictable offence although he has no basis for
charging him with the commission of any offence.
The peace officer is by virtue of Section 438(2) of
the Code required to bring the arrested person
before a Justice of the Peace within 24 hours, if
one is available within that period, and if a Justice
is not available within that period he must bring
the prisoner before the Justice as soon as possible.7
6CRiNAL CODE OF CANADA, §406.
7"438(1). Any one who arrests a person without
warrant shall forthwith deliver that person to a peace
officer, and the peace officer may detain the person until
he is dealt with in accordance with this section. (2) A
peace officer who receives delivery of and detains a person who has been arrested without warrant or who
arrests a person with or without warrant shall, in accordance with the following provisions, take or cause
that person to be taken before a justice to be dealt with
according to law, namely,
(a) where a justice is available within a period of
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If, during that period, as a result of his investigation or as a result of admissions made by the
prisoner, the officer obtains sufficient evidence to
warrant the laying of a charge, he may. do so;
otherwise, the prisoner must be discharged upon
being brought before the justice as required by
Section 438(2).
The wide powers conferred by Section 435 may
be justified as a form of preventive justice, and
no doubt the taking into custody of a person whom
the police believe is about to commit a crime has
some therapeutic value even though no charge is
ultimately laid. A recent case decided by the Ontario Court of Appeal makes it dear, however,
that in order to justify himself under this section
the officer must have some objective grounds for
believing that the person arrested was about to
commit an indictable offence.
In Koechlin v. Waugh & Hamilton,8 the plaintiff
was awarded damages against two policemen for
unlawful arrest. The plaintiff was walking home
with a friend after having attended a picture
show. There had been a number of crimes .of
breaking and entering in the area, and the attention of the defendant officers was attracted to the
plaintiff and his companion by reason of the dress
of the plaintiff's companion, who was wearing
rubbersoled shoes and a windbreaker. The officers
asked the plaintiff to identify himself and, when
he refused, removed him forcibly to the police
station. Laidlaw, J. A., in delivering the judgment
of the court, said:
"A police officer has not in law an unlimited
power to arrest a law-abiding citizen. The power
given expressly to him by the Criminal Code to
arrest without warrant is contained in s. 435,
but we direct careful attention of the public to
the fact that the law empowers a police officer
in many cases and under certain circumstances
to require a person to account for his presence
and identify himself and to furnish other intwenty-four hours after the person has been delivered to or has been arrested by the peace
officer, the person shall be taken before a justice
before the expiration of that period; and
(b) where a justice is not available within a period of
twenty-four hours after the person has been delivered to or has been arrested by the peace
officer, the person shall be taken before a justice
as soon as possible."
Since the provisions of §438 are for the benefit of
the prisoner, it would seem that the officer might lawfully release the prisoner at any time before the expiration of the period without taking his prisoner before a
Justice of the Peace.
8 (1957] O.W.N. 245, 118 Can. C.C. 24.
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formation, and any person who wrongfully fails
to comply with such lawful requirements does
so at the risk of arrest and imprisonment. None
of these circumstances exist in this case. No
unnecessary restriction on his power which
results in increased difficulty to a police officer
to perform his duties of office should be imposed
by a Court. At the same time, the rights and
freedom under law from unlawful arrest and
imprisonment of an innocent citizen must be
fully guarded by the Courts. In this case, the
fact that the companion of the infant plaintiff
was wearing rubber-soled shoes and a windbreaker and that his dress attracted the attention of the police officers, falls far short of reasonable and probable grounds for believing that
the infant plaintiff had committed an indictable
offence or was about to commit such an offence.
We do not criticize the police officers in any
way for asking the infant plaintiff and his companion to identify themselves, but we are satisfied that when the infant plaintiff, who was
entirely innocent of any wrong doing, refused to
do so, the police officer has no right to use force
to compel him to identify himself. It would have
been wise and, indeed, a duty as a good citizen,
for the infant plaintiff to have identified himself
when asked to do so by the police officers. It is
altogether likely that if the infant plaintiff
has been courteous and co-operative, the incident giving rise to this action would not have
occurred, but that does not in law excuse the
defendants for acting as they did in the particular circumstances ..
The Koechlin case, supra, may be contrasted
with that of R. v. Beaudete.10 In the latter case,
the accused appealed from his conviction on a
charge of unlawfully resisting a peace officer in the
execution of his duty in arresting the accused.
The principal ground of appeal was that the officer
was not authorized by law to arrest the accused
in the circumstances and hence was not acting in
the execution of his duty. The evidence disclosed
that the accused had been in a beverage room and
had become intoxicated. When he refused to leave
at the dosing hour, the police were summoned and
they eventually persuaded the accused to leave.
' See also R. v. Carroll,[1960] O.W.N. 9, holding that
in the circumstances before the court the accused was
under no duty to identify himself to the constable when
requested so to do.
10 118 Can. C.C. 295 (1957).

Outside the premises a man in a taxi, of which the
accused was the owner, shouted to the accused to
drive him home. It became evident to the police
that the accused intended to drive the car while
in an intoxicated condition. The court, in dismissing the appeal, held that there was substantial
justification for the police officer entertaining the
belief that accused was about to commit the indictable offence of driving a motor vehicle while
intoxicated. These authorities make it abundantly
clear that the peace officer is confined within
the limits of the powers conferred on him by the
statute, and when he interferes with the liberty
of the citizen he does so with the knowledge
that he may subsequently be called upon to
justify his action in a court of law.
It is of course a truism that a police officer investigating a crime is entitled to question any
person that he thinks may be able to throw light
upon the subject whether or not he suspects the
person to whom the questions are directed. However, there is no general right to detain a person
for questioning unless that detention is specifically
authorized by Section 435 or some other statutory
provision. If the person sought to be questioned
chooses to co-operate, well and good, but if he
does not the peace officer must be prepared to
make an arrest and subsequently justify his action
or let the citizen continue on his way. Very frequently the police assert that a suspected person
voluntarily accompanied them to a police station
for questioning although he was not under arrest
and hence free to refuse if he had desired to do so.
Under the vagrancy section of the Code a police
officer has a certain limited right to call upon a
person to justify his presence at a particular place.
Section 164 of the Code in part defines a vagrant
as one who,
"(a) not having any visible means of support is
found wandering abroad or trespassing and does
not when required justify his presence in the
place where he is found."
POWER TO SEARCH SUSPECTED PERSONS

Generally speaking, a police officer has no right
to search a suspected person unless he is under
arrest, and such unlawful interference with the
person would render him liable in an action for
damages for assault. A peace officer has the right
to search a person under arrest for the purpose of
discovering evidence of the crime for which he
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has been arrested or for weapons with which he
might do harm to himself or others."
In R. v. Brezack 2 the accused appealed against
his conviction on a charge of assaulting a peace
officer in the execution of his duty. The peace
officer arrested the accused in the reasonable belief
that he way carrying narcotic drugs in his mouth;
he seized the accused by the throat and thrust his
fingers into the accused's mouth and was bitten
by the accused. The court held that under the
circumstances the officer was justified in thrusting
his fingers into the accused's mouth and that
accused was properly convicted.
The police may be assisted in the investigation
of certain types of crimes by special statutory
provisions. Section 19 of the Opium and Narcotic
Drug Act 3 provides that a peace officer who has
reasonable cause to suspect that any drug is kept
concealed in any place may search such place for
such drug without a warrant and, if necessary,
by force may search any person therefound. Under
Section 76(1) of the Highway Traffic Act, 1 every
operator of a motor vehicle is required to carry
his license with him at all times while he is in
charge of a motor vehicle and to produce it when
demanded by a constable.
The Ontario Liquor Control Act" by Section
110 authorizes a police officer, if he believes that
liquor is unlawfully kept or had for unlawful purposes, to search without warrant for such liquor
wherever he may suspect it to be. Moreover, the
officer may search by force, if need be, anyone who
is suspected to have such liquor upon him.
DUTY OF PEACE OFFICER TO GIVE NOTICE OF
THE CAUSE OF ARREST

At common law a peace officer who arrested a
person either with or without a warrant is, subject
to certain exceptions, required to inform the person
arrested of the cause of arrest." If the citizen is
not so informed the peace officer is liable for false
imprisonment.
That duty is now statutory in Canada. Section
29 of the Criminal Code provides as follows:
" CRANSHAW'S CRnaNAL CODE OF CANADA 78
(7th ed.).
'2 [1949] O.R. 888,96 Can. C.C. 97.
I R.S.C., c.201 (1952). The right to search premises
without warrant probably does not extend to a dwelling
house.
11R.S.O., c.167 (1950).
's R.S.O., c.210 (1950).
16Christie v. Leachinsky, [1947] A.C. 573.
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"(1) It is the duty of every one who executes a
process or warrant to have it with him,
where it is feasible to do so, and to produce
it when requested to do so.
(2) It is the duty of every one who arrests a
person, whether with or without warrant,
to give notice to that person, where it is
feasible to do so, of
(a) the process or warrant under which
he makes the arrest, or
(b) the reason for the arrest.
(3) Failure to comply with subsection (1) or
(2) does not of itself deprive a person who
executes a process or warrant, or a person
who makes an arrest, or those who assist
them, of protection from criminal responsibility."
It will be noted that subsection (3) provides
that failure to comply with subsection (1) or (2)
does not of itself deprive the person making the
arrest of protection from criminal responsibility.
The civil responsibility of the person making the
arrest remains as it was at common law.
In Garthus v. Van Caeseele,' 17 Lord, J., said: "It
has been held that although police officers bona
fide and on reasonable grounds believed a person
had committed an offence but failed to inform
him as to why he was being arrested, they would
be liable in damages for false imprisonment."
In Koechlin v. Waugh & Hamilton, Laidlaw, J. A.,
speaking for the court said.'
"We direct attention to an important fact.
The infant plaintiff was not told by either of
the police officers any reason for his arrest. The
infint plaintiff was entitled to know on what
charge or on suspicion of what crime he was
seized. He was not required in law to submit
to restraint on his freedom unless he knew the
reason why that restraint should be imposed."
The right of the accused to be informed of the
cause of arrest is not absolute and does not exist
if the circumstances are such that he must know
the general nature of the alleged offence for which
he is detained or if the menacing attitude of the
accused and his associates renders it impractical
for the officer to inform him of the cause of arrest. 19
17122 Can. C.C. 369, 374 (1959).
[1957] O.W.N. 245, 247.
(S
19 R. v. Beaudette, supra note 10; R. v. Hurlen, 123
Can. C.C. 54 (1959); R. v. George, 63 Can. C.C. 225
(1934), ff'd on app. to the Sup. Ct. of Can., 67 Can. C.C.
33 (1936); R. v. Bain, 111 Can. C.C. 281 (1955).
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B. England
GLANVILLE L. WILLIAMS*
procedure in his evidence before the Royal Commission on Police Powers. The suspect was put in
the waiting room and given a bed there, not in a
cell; he was questioned freely without caution or
charge, but was fed and treated well, and not
kept in this condition for more than three days.'
Commenting on this, the Royal Commission
The questioning of suspects
pointed out that in the case of Voisin2 the detention
was for four days; and an admission made by
A constable may, of course, invite the suspect's
voluntary co-operation in the further investiga- Voisin while in this custody was held admissible
tion of the suspected offence. He may question against him. The Commission had no doubt that
him, either in the street or, with his consent, in the practice of detention for questioning was
illegal: any form of restraint is in law an imprisonthe police station.
If the suspect is requested to remain where he ment; nor is the alleged distinction material for
is for questioning, he need not answer the questions the purpose of Rule 33 of the Judges' Rules, reput to him; but if he does submit to answer, he lating to questioning. This, too, was the opinion
and it is abundantly clear on
may give the constable sufficient material to jus- of the Home Office,
the authorities.4 The decision in Voisin is not to
tify an arrest, even though there were insufficient
grounds of suspicion before. It seems that the the contrary, for that merely shows that an
suspect's refusal to stop and answer could not add admission may be allowed to be given in evidence
anything to the constable's justification. This although obtained contrary to the Judges' Rules.
Since Christie v. Leachinsky5 it has become
is because the exercise by the citizen of his conclear that detention for questioning cannot be
stitutional right to keep silent cannot be regarded
justified as an arrest, even in circumstances where
as a circumstance of suspicion.
the police would have power to arrest. A suspect
detained for questioning is not informed that any
Detentionfor questioning
charge is made against him; consequently his
Can the officer, in the earliest stage of suspicion
imprisonment cannot be supported by common-law
and without any arrest, use force to make the
or statutory powers of arrest. It seems that this
suspect stop and submit to questioning, or to
make him go to the police station for questioning? is so even though the particular statute uses some
Continental systems recognise a distinction be- word other than "arrest." Parliament has no
tween arrest proper and detention for questioning: fixed language in relation to arrest; instead of
the latter, unlike the former, does not require using the expression "arrest" it may allow a
reasonable suspicion or a definite charge. It is constable to "apprehend," "detain," "seize and
quite common even in the most liberal and detain," or "take into custody." Pretty evidently,
all these are synonyms for "arrest." Even a
democratic of Continental countries for a suspect
to lie in prison for many months, without a
I RoYAL Comm'N ON PouIcE Powxis, MmUTs oF
definite charge, while the police are building up the EVIDENCE 1385 et seq. (1928).
2 [1918] 1 K.B. 531 (C.C.A.).
case against him. Even in England the police
34 CiD. No. 3297, at 55 (1929).
make a practice of "detention for questioning",
Dunne v. Clinton, [1930] Ir. R. 366, is directly in
though they limit it at most to three or four days. point. But the rule is also evident from the cases
requiring arrested persons to be taken before a magis-"
The suspect is not regarded as under arrest, yet trate
as soon as reasonably possible (e.g., John Lewis &
he is not at liberty. Sir Archibald Bodkin, the Co. v. Tims, [1952] A.C. 676). It is clear that this rule
Director of Public Prosecutions, described the cannot be circumvented by claiming that the accused
is not arrested but only detained. The judges set their
* Reader in English Law in the University of faces against detention in custody for the purpose of
Cambridge and a Fellow of Jesus College, Cambridge. collecting evidence without bringing the subject before
Additional biographical data may be found in 51 a magistrate: Wright v. Court, 4 B.&C. 596 (1825).
I [1947] A.C. 573.
J. Cran. L., C. & P.S. 166 (1960).
To apprehend a suspect as a step in charging
him with crime is a serious matter. What can the
police do short of this? Whether or not they have
power to arrest in a particular instance, may they.
take some action against a suspect which does not
amount to arrest?
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statute using the word "detain" would not
authorise an indefinite detention without bringing
the prisoner before a magistrate. Nor would it
authorise a detention without stating the reason
for the arrest. Exceptionally, there is a group of
statutes authorising the police to search for goods
unlawfully possessed. 6 Apart from these statutes,
and a few other statutes of limited scope, every
detention for questioning is a false imprisonment,
unless it satisfies the rules for a valid arrest.
Although the law on this subject is reasonably
dear, there is much evidence that the practice
of detention for questioning continues. On some
occasions the police protect themselves by using
the language of request, but there can be no doubt
that on other occasions, when compulsion is
evidently intended, the action of the police is
illegal.
The objection to "detention for questioning"
is that it deprives the accused of the safeguards
that have been thought necessary to be included
in the law of arrest. The argument in its favour
is that the man may be innocent, and then detention without charge gives him a good prospect of
being released without any publicity or stigma.
The importance of avoiding publicity where guilt
is not fairly dear was recognized by the Royal
Commission which referred in its Report to
Section 19 of the Indictable Offences Act of 1848
(now Section 4 of the Magistrates' Courts Act of
1952), which allows the preliminary examination
to be conducted behind dosed doors. "In cases
where the police find that a mistake has been
made, although a charge has been preferred, and
wish merely to ask for the prisoner's discharge, or
where they propose to ask for a remand on evidence
so slight as still to admit of the possibility that they
have got the wrong man, we think that, in the
words of the section, 'the ends of justice will be
best answered' by conducting the proceedings
in camera." For some reason this valuable suggestion seems never to have been acted on, and indeed
the statutory power of proceeding in camera
has rarely been used.
In the type of case first mentioned in the abovequoted passage from the Commission's Report,
namely where a charge has been made and the
police now wish to discontinue the case, it may be
suggested that no appearance before a magistrate
is necessary.
6 See the last section of this article.
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Defects in the law
The extent to which the police are hindered
by not possessing a power of detention for questioning stands in inverse relation to the extent of
their powers of arrest. The English law of arrest
is extremely complex, and little purpose would be
served in reproducing the multifarious statutes
which give special powers. However, it is worth
mentioning the power of arrest of those "found"
in certain private premises for an unlawful purpose,
and the power of arrest of suspected persons who
loiter with intent to commit felony. These powers
are indulgently construed; 7 but still they would
not justify an arrest if the court took the view that
the suspicion felt by the officer was unreasonable.
The real reason why the police wish to detain
for questioning is because they feel that they have
not sufficient evidence to make a positive charge,
and yet they have enough to put them on enquiry.
Under the present law, there is no power to detain
for questioning without arrest even for a few
minutes, and even though the suspect's name and
address are unknown. Nor is there a general
power to arrest on refusal of name and address.
This is an inadequacy in the police powers of
law enforcement, or would be so if actions against
the police were commoner than they now are.
The distinction between command and request
The foregoing remarks do not mean that every
request by a police constable to a suspect to
accompany him to the police station, followed by
acquiescence, amounts to an arrest. One has to
face the very difficult distinction between a
command and a request.
It is submitted that if the officer merely makes
a request to the suspect, giving him to understand
that he is at liberty to come or refuse, there is no
imprisonment and no arrest. If, however, the
impression is conveyed that there is" no such
option and that the suspect is compelled to come,
it is an imprisonment. The distinction does not
turn merely on the words used but on the way in
which they are spoken and on all the circumstances.
All manner of ambiguous expressions may be used
by the officer, as if he says: "I must ask you to
come with me"; or "I think it would be better if
you came with me"; or, weaker, "I suggest that'
we both go to the police station where you can
tell your story to the superintendent." The question
See [1955] CRim. L.R. 66, 136.
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"Will you come with me?" may look in print like a
request; but it is capable of being intoned as an
imperative instead of as a question, and will then
be a'command.
This view of the law, that a person who goes
voluntarily is not imprisoned, runs counter to the
charge to the jury of Alderson, B., in Peters v.
Stanway.8 He said:
"The question as to the verdict will depend,
not on whether the plaintiff went voluntarily from
the defendant's house to the stationhouse, but
whether she volunteered to go in the first instance.
There is a great difference between the case of a
person who volunteers to go in the first instance,
and that of a person who, having a charge made
against him, goes voluntarily to meet it. The
question, therefore, is, whether you think the
going to the stationhouse proceeded originally
from the plaintiff's own willingness, or from the
defendant's making a charge against her; for, if it
proceeded from the defendant's making a charge,
the plaintiff will not be deprived of her right of
action by her having willingly gone to meet the
charge."
The ruling of Alderson, B., even if accepted,
might not invalidate the practice of the police in
inviting a suspect to go to the police station to
help them with their enquiries into a specified
crime, because this form of words does not involve
the making of a charge. However, it is possible
that the learned Baron would have regarded the
formula as equivalent to the making of a charge.
It is submitted that in any event his ruling is
unacceptable, because it giyes too great an ambit
to the concept of false imprisonment.
The ruling of Alderson, B., was quoted with
approval in the Canadian case of Conn v. David
Spencer Ltd.9 The plaintiff was making some purchases in a self-service store, when he was mistakenly accused by the house detective of stealing
soap. The detective requested him to jo upstairs,
which after some demur he did, thinking it advisable to give way in view of the crowded state
of the store. In the upstairs room, the plaintiff
consented to be searched, and, no soap being found,
he was allowed to leave. In an action for false
imprisonment, the store detective (who was a
woman) admitted that she maintained control over
the plaintiff, and that if he had tried to escape she
might not have been able to hold him but would
86 C.&P. 737, 172 E.R. 1442 (1835).
942 B.C.R. 128, [1930] 1 D.L.R. 805, 1 W.W.R.

have done her best to prevent it. On these facts
the Supreme Court of British Columbia held that
there was a false imprisonment. The decision was
justifiable on the facts of the case, but it may be
perhaps respectfully doubted whether those facts
necessitated approval being given to the ruling of
Alderson, B.
At first sight it may seem attractive to argue
that a request to visit the police station should
always be taken as a command in law unless the
police make it dear that the request can be
declined. To the ordinary citizen, a request of the
police is a command-particularly if he feels himself implicated in suspicion. On the other hand,
there are certainly some cases where a request
cannot be taken as a command. For example, it
sometimes happens that the police leave a note at
the house of a suspect, asking him to attend at
the police station because it is thought that he
may be able to help them with their enquiries into a
specified matter. Such a written request cannot be
construed as carrying an implied threat of immediate force if the request be not complied with.
Even where the request is conveyed by word of
mouth, it would be a strong thing in many circumstances to regard it as equivalent to a command. An ordinary witness may sometimes be
invited to attend at the police station to give
evidence, and it would be absurd to hold that this
invitation when accepted amounts to a false
imprisonment by the police. The argument that
there is an imprisonment is stronger when the
request is addressed to the suspect. Yet the suspect
may not know at that moment how strong the
suspicion is against him; and the police may not
have made up their minds to arrest him. To
interrogate a suspect by arrangement at the police
station -is often kinder than an official visit to his
home, because the latter may be harmful to his
reputation. The suspect may well feel that, if he
has to visit the police station, he would rather
go there "voluntarily" to assist the police.in their
enquiries than under technical arrest. A newspaper
report of the suspect's being arrested is more
damaging to him than a report that he has visited
the police station. Also, the law creating the
offence of escape comes into operation only if there
has been a technical arrest; and for this reason, if
for no other, the courts should be slow to find that
there is an arrest unless the suspect has dearly
been told that he is under arrest.
On all these accounts, it seems dearly necessary
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to maintain the distinction between a command
which results in an imprisonment and a request
which does not, and to hold that there can be no
imprisonment in the absence of words or conduct
by the arrester intimating that the suspect is
under arrest or that force will be used if he fails
to comply with the invitation.
The best course for the suspect, if he is "invited" to accompany the officer to the police
station and if he wishes to decline the invitation,
is to ask point-blank: "Is this an arrest?" If the
answer is in the affirmative, he will then have his
action for false imprisonment if he complies and
the arrest is illegal. If the answer is in the negative,
he can refuse the invitation and will not be guilty
of obstructing the police.
The interpretation of words as amounting to
command or request is somewhat affected by the
proceedings in which it has to be determined. If
the suspect is being charged with escape, or with
obstructing the officer in the execution of his duty,
the question is: did the suspect realise that he was
under arrest? If the suspect is suing for the
tort of false imprisonment, the question is: did the
officer intentionally or negligently cause the suspect
to believe that he was under arrest or otherwise
detained? If the officer is being prosecuted for
the crime of false imprisonment, the question is:
did he intentionally or recklessly cause the suspect
to believe that he was under arrest or otherwise
detained? The distinction between the tort and
the crime arises from the fact that on a charge
of crime, mens tea must be shown. In each case
the question is what was conveyed to the mind of
the suspect, except that in a legal proceeding
against the officer fault or mens rea has to be
considered.
The effect of a secret intention to detain
In English law a person can be falsely imprisoned
without his knowledge. This follows from Meering
v. Grahame-White Aviation Co. 10 where the Court
of Appeal held that a man was falsely imprisoned
when he was kept in an office under pretence of his
evidence being needed, there being men stationed
outside the door to prevent his escape, even though
he did not realise that he had been deprived of
his liberty. Atkin, L. J., said that "a person can be
imprisoned while he is asleep, while he is in a
state of drunkenness, while he is unconscious, and
while he is a lunatic." The concluding reference
10122 L.T. 44 (1919).
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to the lunatic may be thought to be beside the
point, because even a lunatic is physically able
to move about, so that the question of imprisonment is in his case a realistic one. The case of the
unconscious man is different; he cannot move, and
it may seem somewhat pedantic to assert that if
his door is locked and then unlocked during the
state of unconsciousness, he can, when he gets to
kn6w of it, sue for nominal charges for false
imprisonment. It is true that false imprisonment,
being an application of trespass vi et armis, is
actionable per se; but this assumes that there has
been an imprisonment. Although the decision of
the Court of Appeal settles the law for all English
courts short of the House of Lords, it will not
necessarly be followed in other jurisdictions.
Section 42 of the Restatement of the Law of Torts
adopts fhe opposite rule and rejects the opinion
of the English Court of Appeal.
An analogy with battery may bring out the
difficulty in the English view. Suppose that D
points a loaded pistol at P from behind, and is
about to pull the trigger when he is stopped by the
intervention of a third party. P is unaware of the
whole incident until he gets to hear of it afterwards.
No tort has been committed against P. It is not an
assault because he suffered no apprehension. D is
guilty of the crime of attempted battery, and also
of other graver crimes; he is punishable in the
criminal law for his wicked intent; but he is not
liable in tort, because his intended victim did not
suffer any damage-not even the momentary
damage of apprehension. Returning now to the
person who is imprisoned without knowing it,
it is submitted that he should not be able to
recover in tort, because he has sustained no
damage of any kind-he suffers no anxiety or
humiliation, except possibly in retrospect, and
there is not even a momentary contact with his
person or property.
The decision in Meering's case is of doubtful
policy because it seems to penalise a person who
acts with caution and consideration. If P is
reasonably suspected of a felony like shoplifting
(larceny), and if the felony has been committed
by someone, it is generally lawful for D to say to
him: "I arrest you on a charge of stealing goods
from the counter." But if D, wishing to give P
every chance to explain himself, and trying to
avoid an accusation unless it becomes absolutely
necessary, says to P: "Please step this way because the manager would like to see you," and
then stands outside the door in case P decides to
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run away while he is being questioned, this is an
actionable tort. Meering's case decides that it is an
imprisonment, and if so, it cannot be justified
as an arrest, because there has been no proper
communication of the cause of arrest to the person
arrested. There seems to be no social policy in
penalising such conduct when an outright arrest
would be lawful.
Another argument may be developed against
Meering's case by supposing the following pair of
hypothetical cases. (1) D is a policeman sitting
next to P. He suddenly suspects P of a minor
-crime (for which he has no power to arrest) and
makes up his mind that if P attempts flight, he
will apprehend him. Shortly afterwards the
circumstances of suspicion are explained, and D
changes his mind. He is not liable in trespass for
false imprisonment, because there has been no
act on D's part, but only a mental resolution.
(2) As before, except that D moved to P's side
after forming the intention to detain P. Here there
is an act, namely of moving, so that this particular
requirement of the action of trespass is satisfied.
But is it not excessively technical to say that there
is a false imprisonment, in the absence of any
.actual restraint and of any constraint upon the
mind of the person supposed to be imprisoned?
Let us suppose that D communicated his intention
to P, but P refused to submit to the arrest, and
walked away unmolested. The law is that there
is then no arrest because there is no actual restraint
and no touching of the body." If this is so, there
can surely be no arrest before the intention to
arrest has even been communicated.
The practical effect of Meering's case seems to be
that, where the police have requested a suspect to
attend to help them with their enquiries and the
suspect complies but afterwards sues for false
imprisonment, the outcome of the action will
depend upon the answer to a hypothetical question
addressed to the police officer on cross-examination.
The officer may be asked what he would have done
if the plaintiff had attempted to escape. If the
-officer replies that he would have let him go, and
is believed, there is no imprisonment. If the officer
replies that he would have tried to stop him,u
there is an imprisonment.
This assumes that the officer's secret intent is
accompanied by a course of conduct on the officer's
part, as where the officer walks to the station with

the suspect. Such a course of conduct constitutes
the "act" which makes the officer liable in trespass.
But now suppose that the officer's secret intent is
unaccompanied by an act on his part. This may
happen if the intent is formed only after the suspect is in the police station. The police have been
interrogating him and at a certain point in their
interrogation become convinced that they are on
the right track. In that event, as the Royal
3
Commission on Police Powers pointed out,
either of two courses may properly be pursued.
The police may ask the suspect whether he is
willing to stay voluntarily at the station until his
statements have been verified. But as soon as he
expresses a wish to leave, the police should either
let him go or else arrest him and adopt the procedure of the formal charge. If they do not do this,
but continue to keep him at the police station
(perhaps for further questioning), secretly intending not to let him go, can there be said to be an
imprisonment? The question is a difficult one, on
which there is no direct judical authority. If there
is an imprisonment, it is certainly illegal; it cannot be justified as an arrest, because the grounds
of the arrest have not been communicated, so that
the rule in Christie v. Leachinsky"4 is violated.
It may be argued that there is an imprisonment,
under the doctrine of Meering's case. But in
Meering's case there was a positive act of imprisonment by the servants of the defendant, who
stationed themselves near the room in which the
plaintiff was in order to prevent the plaintiff
escaping from the room should he try to do so.
In the case we are considering, there is no positive
act, but, merely a mental resolution on the part
of a policeman not to let the suspect go. Can the
formation of a mental state mark the transition
from a state of affairs that is not an imprisonment
to one that is? Surprising as it may at first appear,
the answer seems to be in the affirmative. For
example, suppose that an employer locks the
factory gates in order to prevent the ingress of
unauthorised persons. An employee demands to be
allowed to leave before the end of his work period,
and the employer then for the first time decides
to keep the gates locked to prevent the egress of
the employee. It would seem that, were it not for
the defence of consent on the part of the employee,'
the employer would be guilty of a false imprison-

([1954] Cknu. L.R. 11-14.
'nThis was the fatal reply given in Conn v. David
Spencer Ltd., op. cit. supra note 9.

It [1947J A.C. 573.
"$See Burns v. (C.A.).
Johnston, [19161 2 Ir.R. 444, affd,
[1917] 2 Ir.R. 137

's Cm. No. 3297, at 59 (1929).
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ment, notwithstanding that his wrong consists of
a mental resolution resulting in an omission to
act.
The "frisking" of criminals
Where a suspected criminal is also suspected
of being offensively armed, can the police search
him for arms, by tapping his pockets, before making
up their minds whether to arrest him? There is no
English authority, but the power is so obviously
necessary for the protection of the police that it is
difficult to believe that it can be condemned by the
courts. It might be regarded as a reasonable extension of the existing law of self-defence, or as an
application of the doctrine of necessity, or as an
essential power of the police in the performance of
their duty of preserving the peace.
Motor vehicles
The police have an important power of controlling motor vehicles, without being put to the
embarrassment of arresting the driver. By Section
20(3) of the Road Traffic Act of 1930 a police
constable in uniform can require any vehicle to
stop; and he can then exercise his statutory powers
of demanding to see the driving licence or insurance certificate. 16 It is not stated in the Act for
what other purpose the officer may require the
vehicle to remain stationary, and one'is safe in
saying that the power to stop a vehicle does not
give the power to detain it indefinitely. Probably
the vehicle can be detained only for a reasonable
time as a mode of controlling traffic. There is
certainly no power under- the Act to search the
vehicle or to require its occupants to alight. At the
same time, the power to stop gives a useful means
of delaying a suspected criminal and ascertaining
his identity. Also, it seems safe to say that comparatively small circumstances of suspicion would
suffice to justify an arrest under Section 28(3) of
the Act, which empowers a police constable to
arrest a person whom he reasonably suspects of
driving a vehicle without the owner's consent.
When the arrest has been made under this section,
it may well be found that a big fish has been
netted, since fleeing criminals often drive purloined
vehicles.
Goods vehicles are subject to a special r6gime.
Section 16 of the Road and Rail Traffic Act of
1933 requires the holder of a licence for the carriage
of goods to cause work records to be kept showing
particulars of each journey, etc.; and regulations
made under this Act require the works records to
IsRoAD TRAFFIC ACT, §§ 4(5), 40(1) (1930).
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be carried on the vehicle. 7 By Section 8, examiners
appointed under the Act, and also police constables,
may require the driver to produce his work records, and may inspect and copy them. The
same statutory powers are applied to the provisions of the Transport Act of 1947, by Section
60(4) of that Act.
Whether acting under the Road Traffic Acts
or not, the police do in fact stop vehicles and
question drivers as a means of controlling crime.
Their activities are sometimes strikingly rewarded.
On August 13, 1955, at 2 a.m. a band of armed men
broke into a military training centre at Arborfid
and stole arms and ammunition which they carried
off in vans. Before the theft had been reported, two
policemen in a radio car, carrying out a routine
check on the Reading-Ascot road, stopped and
searched a two-ton motorvan. Two men inside
offered no resistance. In the back were 15,000
rounds of the missing ammunition."8 It is not clear
whether the search of the van was lawful, but the
police certainly had a right to see the driver's
work records, and possibly some circumstance connected with these records or the demeanour of the
men aroused a reasonable suspicion of felony.
Statutory powers of search and arrest on the ground
of unlawful possession
It remains to be mentioned that there are certain
local statutes giving the police power to search
vessels and carriages on reasonable suspicion that
they are being used to convey stolen goods, and
also to search persons who may be reasonably
suspected of such conveyance. The first of these
statutes was the metropolitan Police Act of 1839,
Section 66. It is still extensively used in London,
the police stopping several hundred thousand
people a year in the streets and asking to see the
contents of a bag they are carrying, or enquiring
as to any other thing they may have which may
possibly have been stolen. Litigation rarely arises
and the police report that they have few complaints; yet their exercise of the statutory powers
does not seem to be legal. The statute is plainly
limited to cases where the police have reason to
suppose that a stolen article is being conveyed;
yet they use it to make a random check in the
hope of netting a thief or receiver. In any case,
most large cities are without these special powers,
and Parliament is no longer willing to extend them
to areas where they do not now exist.
GGoons VEHcLs (KEEPING op REcoans) REGULATioNs, [1935] STAT. Ru-Es & ORDERS (No. 314).
Is News Chronicle, August 15, 1955.
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C. France
ROBERT VOUIN*
(a) Generally, according to the new Code of
Penal Procedure, applicable in France since March
2, 1959, a person can be taken into custody only
if the examining magistrate (Juge d'Instruction)
has delivered a warrant of arrest against him.'
However, the Code provides otherwise in the
case of an obvious crime (or of offences of moderate
gravity punished by a sentence of imprisonment
where such offences are obvious), that is to say,
in the case of the crime which is being committed
or has just been committed, or in the case where,
shortly after a crime, a person is either prosecuted
by public outcry or in possession of objects or
presenting signs leading to a suspicion he participated in the crime.2 In such a case, in fact,
any person is qualified to arrest the author of a
flagrant offence and to take him before the nearest
judicial police officer; in this instance, no warrant
of justice is necessary.3
In addition to the right to arrest, the French
law grants also to the Police (that is to say to the
Gendarmerie Nationale, to the Surete Nationale,
and in Paris to the Prefecture de Police) the right
of keeping a close watch on someone, or checking
his identity, or searching him.
1.-Keeping a close watch on somebodyIn the case of a crime or a flagrant delict, the
judicial police officer in charge of the investigation
may keep in his power, for 24 hours at the most,
three categories of persons:
(1) Those who happen to be at the place of the
breach of the law.
(2) Those for whom it seems necessary, to
establish or verify identity.
(3) Those who seem able to give information
on the facts. This keeping on a dose watch may be
extended for another period of 24 hours, with
written permission from the "Procureur of the
Republique," but only in the case of persons
against whom serious and concordant incriminating
evidence exists. 4 Persons kept on a dose watch
may be interrogated by the judicial police officers,
provided they observe a certain number of rules
* Professor of Criminal Law, Faculty of Law,
University of Paris. Additional biographical data may
be found in 51 J. Cni. L., C. & P.S. 169 (1960).
'CODE OF PENAL PROCEDURE (hereinafter C.P.P.),
art. 122.
2 C.P.P., arts. 53, 57.
3 C.P.P., art. 73.
4C.P.P., art. 63.

which tend to guarantee the correctness of the
5
close watch and of the interrogation.
On another hand, even outside the case of crime
and flagrant delict, the judicial police officer may
carry out enquiries called "preliminary enquiries,"
either on the Procureur de la Republique's request or of his own accord.6 In this case, housesearches and seizures of material evidence may be
carried out only with the written permission of the
persons whose houses are thus visited. However,
the judicial police officer may then legally retain
at his disposal certain persons for 24 hours at the
most "for the necessities of preliminary enquiry,"
and this delay may be extended for another 24
hours by decision of the Procureur de la Republique, even if there is no serious and concordant
7
incriminating evidence.
2.-Checking of Identity-In case of a crime or a
flagrant delict (an in addition to the possibility of
keeping a close watch on a person as just mentioned), "every person whose identity it seems
necessary to establish or check, must lend himself to the operations requested by this measure,"
otherwise he might be liable to imprisonment, and
8
to a fine of 10 days maximum and 360 NF.
It should be noticed that this obligation of
lending oneself to this proof and checking of
identity was provided for previously by the
Article 8, paragraph 1, of the law of Nov. 27,
1943, which created a service of technical police.
Moreover, this text, which was not abrogated at
the time of the coming into force of the Penal
Procedure Code, may be applied even outside the
hypothesis of a crime or a flagrant delict.
On another hand, one should also take into
account the authority given to the military of the
"Gendarmerie Nationale" as it is stated in the
decree of May 20, 1903 (modified by the decree
of August 22, 1958), dealing with the organization and service of the "Gendarmerie". The latter.
for instance, is bound to secure bodily any person
circulating in France without any card stating his
identity (ou bien: without his identity duly
authenticated by documents). To this end, any
policeman in uniform is entitled to ask to be
shown documents of identity and cannot suffer a
5 C.P.P., art. 64.
6 C.P.P., art. 75.
7 C.P.P., art. 77.
8 C.P.P., art. 61.
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refusal. The checking of these documents should
be done in one of the community rooms of the
hotel, never in the traveller's own room, and
generally speaking, "the gendarmerie is directed
to behave with courteousness in performing this
duty, and not to feel entitled to any action which
might be qualified as a vexatious measure or misuse
of authority."
The military personnel of the Gendarmerie may
even use their fire arms if there is no other possibility to arrest persons who, in spite of repeated
calls of "Halte, Gendarmerie," uttered in a loud
voice, try to escape their investigation or custody
or "when it is impossible for them to stop vehicles,
boats or other mean of transportation whose conductors do not obey the order to stop."' 0
Actually, the Gendarmerie, which alone is
granted the right of using fire arms, very seldom
takes advantage of it, for the ordinary "Gendarme", who is always a regular soldier with the
grade of sergeant, is a wise man, disciplined and
self-controlled. In the ordinary course of things,
the only penalty inflicted for the "refusal to
comply" of the driver who refuses to stop is the
one provided by the Article L. 4 of the highway
code (ordonnance of December 15, 1958), according to which "any conductor of a vehicle who
has knowingly omitted to obey the summons to
stop given by an official person or policeman whose
duty is to state breaches of the law, and who
carries the exterior and apparent badges of his
quality, or, who will refuse to submit to all prescribed checkings concerning the vehicle or the
person, will be punished with imprisonment which
can last from ten days to 3 months, and will be
fined from 500 to 3,000 frs, or with one of these
two penalties only."
3.-Searching of a Person-According to the
French Law, one may still wonder to what extent
the police are permitted to practice the searching
of a person, or "fouille a corps," with someone
whose appearance or behaviour aroused police
suspicion.
(b) The fundamental principle according to the
French jurisprudence is that the searching of a
person must be assimilated to the house-search
or domiciliary visit, and that it is legally impossible
whenever the searching of the person's house
itself would be impossible." On the other hand, the
9DicPx

Or MAY 20, 1903

(as modified), arts.

165,0 166.
1 Id., art. 174.
u Cass. Crim., Rec. Dalloz 1953.533 (1953).
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searching of the person may be undertaken by the
judicial police officer when he would be entitled to
carry out a search of the man's house. Mere
suspicions cannot justify the arrest and search of a
person, because they do not make the delict
flagrant. Thus, a judicial police officer cannotwithout a warrant from an examining magistratearrest in the street and search a person who is
merely suspected either of collecting illicit bettings
on horse-races or carrying weapons illegally.u
On the other hand, the searching of such a person
is proper if the delict is flagrant, i.e., if the weapon
is conspicuous or if it can be seen in the person's
hands. 3 In the same way, the arrest and searching
of a person are also possible when a judicial police
officer knows for certain that a person carries
with him a certain quantity of a drug, such as
14
cocain.
Also, the French jurisprudence admits of
searching a person who is legally under arrest as a
"mere police measure, the application of which is
general and necessary, taken as well for the public
interest as for the arrested person's interest."
And, in this case, a penal sentence may be built
upon the facts established in the process of the
searching. If, for instance, a person is searched
after having been arrested because, drunk and
disorderly, he has been a cause of disturbances, the
discovery of a gun on this person justifies his
being sentenced for "port d'arme prohib6" (carrying unlawful weapons).

15

If these solutions are quite certain, there is still a
question, in France, whether the "garde a vue"
(keeping a dose watch on somebody), now admitted and under the regulation of the Code of
Penal Procedure, must be assimilated to a real
arrest-in a word, to know whether the person on
whom the police keep a close watch may be subjected to a search as in the case of a person legally
arrested. Until the question is solved by the
jurisprudence, it is propounded to admit that the
searching of a person merely kept on watch is
possible, as a "mere police measure," if the person
is kept for serious and concordant incriminating
evidence.'" According to the decree of May 20,
1903, Article 307, the persons arrested by the
constabulary in the case of a crime or a flagrant
Rec. Dalloz 1929.2.46 (1928).
"sIbid.
"1Nimes, Rec. Sirey 1930.2.80 (1930).
1"Nimes, Rec. Dalioz 1928.2.64 (1926).
6Cf. BEssoN, VourN & AOPAmLAxGE,
'n Nimes,

ANoTA DE PROCADuRE, art. 76, al.l.
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delict, and kept on a dose watch before being
brought before the Public Prosecutor, "must be
searched, in order to insure as well their own
security... or for the discovery of things which
might help to the revelation of the truth."
(c) As we just saw, the French Law gives to the
police a certain number of rights which, outside
all properly so called arrests, allow them to summon persons, to keep them, to hear them and even
to interrogate and possibly to search them. These
powers, of course, are not granted without restrictions and conditions. Related to the dose
watch of persons in the enquiry for flagrant
delict, particularly, Article 64 of the Penal Code
embodies some important dispositions.
First of all, the judicial police officer must
mention on the report of the hearing of the person
who is kept on a dose watch how long the interrogatories and the breaks that divided them
lasted, the exact day and time when the person
started being kept on a dose watch, and the exact
day and time when he or she was either discharged
or brought before the competent magistrate. The
report must mention also the reasons for the
close watch.
Secondly, these mentions must be specially
initialled by the persons concerned (or, in the
case of a refusal of signature, the report must be
made complete by exposing the reasons of the
refusal). In addition, they must appear on a
special register, maintained for this purpose in
every police quarter liable to receive persons kept
a close watch.
Finally, of his own.accord, or on the request of
one of the person's relatives, the public prosecutor
may have the person kept on a dose watch checked
by a doctor at any time during the watch. After

24 hours, this medical examination cannot be
refused if the person who is kept on a close watch
asks for it.
All these precisions are not unimportant. But,
there are still more important guarantees for
indiv'idual liberites, such as those which result
either from the fact that keeping a close watch on a
person, according to the Code, can never be
decided but by a magistrate or a judicial police
officer (and never by an ordinary police constable),
or from the conditions to which the jurisprudence
subordinates the possibility of compelling a person
to be searched.
(d) In France the juridical system explained
above seems to be accepted by the public and the
police do not actually ask for other powers than
the ones which are granted by the legislation.
Concerns expressed at the time of the promulgation of the Code of Penal Procedure concerning the
shortness of time allowed by the Code for keeping
a close watch of a person seem already to have
died away, except perhaps when it comes to
dealing with attempts against the State safety, or
struggles against criminal gangs, such as the ones
which practise the drug-traffic or coinage offence.
However, it is not true that the police, according to the French law, are permitted to summon
anybody in the street, and to ask this person
what he or she is doing, only because the person's
appearance or behaviour might have aroused
suspicion. But one must notice that the policeman
may always speak politely to another person, like
any citizen, and collect his statements, if he gets
any. This possibility, carried on by policemen who
know their jobs, seems to be sufficient, and there
is no need in this matter to change or add anything to the French Law.

D. Germany
WALTER CLEMENS*
In the field of fighting delinquency the police in
Germany have to perform a twofold task: first,
the preventive one of avoiding crimes, and,
secondly, the repressive one of taking part in the
detection and prosecution of crimes. The repressive function of the police will be outlined first.
Their preventive function will be discussed later.
* Head Officer, Ministry of Justice, State of Hamburg, Germany. Additional biographical data may be
found in 51 J. Ciui. L., C. & P.S. 172 (1960).

POLICE RIGHTS AND DUTIES IN THE PROSECUTION

OF CRIME
General duties
Pursuant to Section 152 of the German Code of
Criminal Procedure (hereinafter called CCP),
neither the police nor any other administrative
authority has, in principle, the right to prosecute
in court. This right is exercised exdusively by the
Staatsanwalt (public prosecutor, district attorney),

WALTER CLEMENS

a fully qualified lawyer who has a career position
with permanent tenure. He must take action as
soon as he is notified of any offense punishable in
a criminal court, provided he has reasonable
cause for believing such act to have in fact been
committed. He has no discretion.
In his work he will be supported by the police
who act as the district attorney's "auxiliary
organs." The police, pursuant to Section 161,
CCP, have to comply with all orders and instructions of the district attorney. Further, on their
own initiative they prepare the prosecution for the
district attorney and assist him in his work; their
duties in this regard are laid down in Section 163,
CCP, which provides:
"(i) The offices and officers of the police shall
investigate criminal offenses and take all
measures that permit of no delay, with a view
to preventing collusion in the case.
"(ii) The provisions of sec. 136a and sec. 69(iii)'
will apply.
"(iii) The offices and officers of the police will
submit their reports to the district attorney
without delay. If the speedy grant of judicial
rulings appears necessary during the course
of the investigation, the reports may be summitted directly to the County Court Judge."
According to Section 163, CCP, the police, when
faced with lawbreakers, have the so-called "right
to make the first move" ("Recht des ersten
Zugriffs"). Their concrete measures are subject to
the same restrictions as those of the district
attorney. Just like the district attorney, the police
must respect the rights of the individual, guaranteed by the Basic Law and the provisions of the
CCP.
In detail
(a) Preliminary arrest of suspects
The liberty of the person is guaranteed in
Germany through Article 2(ii) and Article
104(i) of the Basic Law for the Federal Republic
of Germany dated May 23, 1949.2
'These two provisions outlaw the use of dubious
methods in connection with the interrogation of the
defendant
and of a witness.
2
These provisions, as far as of interest here, read:
"Article 2(ii). Everyone shall have the right to life
and to physical inviolability. The freedom of the
individual shall be inviolable. These rights may be
interfered with only on the basis of a law.
"Article 104. (i) The freedom of the individual may
be restricted only on the basis of a formal law and only
with due regard to the forms prescribed therein. Detained persons may be subjected neither to mental nor
physical ill-treatment."
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In implementation of these Basic Law provisions, the right of preliminary arrest is governed
by Section 127, CCP, as follows:
"(i) If a person is caught in the act or on pursuit,
anybody is authorized to apprehend him even in
the absence of a judicial warrant, if he is suspected of escape, or his identity cannot be
established on the spot.
"(ii) In the event of imminent danger the
district attorney and the police are authorized
to make a preliminary arrest, if the legal requirements of a warrant of arrest are complied
with."
While within the limits of subparagraph (i),
supra, everybody-not just the district attorney
and the police-is authorized to make a preliminary arrest, the rights established in Section 127,
CCP, subparagraph (ii), supra, are vested exclusively in the district attorney and all members
of the police.
The use of these rights presupposes that the
facts of the case warrant judicial arrest, and
further that imminent danger prevails. The
3
requirements established in Section 112, CCP,
for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, which can
only be granted by a judge, are strong suspicion of
an offense and danger of escape or collusion.
The first requirement of a preliminary arrest
by the police is therefore that the facts warrant
strong suspicion (that is, a high degree of probability) of the commission of an offense by the
suspect. A faint or remote or even reasonable
suspicion is not sufficient.
In addition to a strong suspicion, either the
danger of escape (Section 112(i)(1), CCP) or the
Section 112, CCP, reads:
"(i) Custody awaiting trial can only be ordered
against the suspect if there is strong suspicion against
the suspect and if
(1) he has escaped or is in hiding or if, in recognition
of the merits of the case, especially the circumstances of the suspect and the opportunities of
an escape, there is cause for concern that he
will evade trial or
(2) if specific facts exist giving rise to the concern
that the suspect by means of destroying traces
of the act or other evidence or by influencing
witnesses or accomplices might impede the
finding of the truth.
(ii) The facts evidencing the suspicion of escape or
danger of collusion must be entered on the record.
The danger of escape requires no further proof if
(1) a major crime is the subject matter of the investigation or
(2) within the area of jurisdiction of this Federal
Law the suspect has no fixed residence or address,
especially if he is a vagrant or fails to prove his
identity."
3
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danger of collusion (Section 112(i)(2), CCP) must
be present. The suspicion of escape will arise if
the offender intends to evade prosecution. Whether
there is suspicion of escape will be decided on the
facts of the case. The police will be safe in assuming
danger of escape if the offender is taking measures
to prepare his escape, e.g., abandoning his regular
work or inquiring about travel facilities. In the
cases of Section 112(ii)(1) and (2) the danger of
escape appears patent and therefore needs no
further proof.
The last requirement of a preliminary police
arrest is "imminent danger." It exists if obtaining a
judicial warrant entails a loss of time which would
give rise to concern that the arrest of the suspected person might thereby become impossible.
The police officer who wants to effect a preliminary arrest pursuant to Section 127, CCP,
has to use his discretion in deciding whether the
mentioned legal requirements are complied with.
A bona fide error in the use of such discretion will
not affect the legality of the arrest made by him.'
Under German Law the preliminarily arrested
person must be taken before a judge who shall
decide whether or not to issue a warrant of arrest.5
The preliminary arrest of a suspected person by
the police is often hampered by the latter's escape
or forcible resistance. The statute does not answer
the question a. to what means may be used to
enforce arrest. It is, however, common ground in
the practice of the courts as well as in the opinion
of the law professors that for the enforcement of
arrest, preliminary or judicial, adequate means,
including necessary force, may be used. The
Supreme Court of the former Deutsche Reich
(Reichsgericht) holds that the extent and limit
of an arrest has to be confined to the purpose of
neutralizing the freedom of movement of the
person to be arrested, and that every force in
excess of actual apprehension shall only be permissible in the event of resistance being offered
to the arrest.6 The chaining or tying of the
suspect is therefore allowed only in an exceptional
case The right to make an arrest does not include
'37 Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts in Strafsachen 37 (Decisions of the Reichsgericht in Criminal
Matters)
and 55 id. 166.
5
This question will be dealt with in a report concerning"Police Interrogation Privilegesand Limitations"
which will appear subsequently in this JouNAL.
617 Entsdieidungen des Reichsgerichts in Strafsaschen
28.
T
See 17 Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts in
Strafsachen 28.

the authority to inflict injuries to life or limb.8
Resistance against a legitimate arrest (e.g., the
person seized by a police officer hits him in the
face or points a pistol at him or a bank-robber
shoots at the police) will justify self-defense by
means of a weapon.9 The use of arms by police
officers is governed in the various German
Ltinder by Service Regulations which-in appreciation of the especially dangerous nature of firearms-limit the use of weapons to a narrow scope.
The requirements which must be complied
with by the police if a suspect is intended to be
deprived of his liberty for prosecution purposes
are governed exhaustively by Section 127, CCP.
If they are not complied with, if, in particular, the
"strong" suspicion is missing (a mere "police
suspicion" will not be sufficient), the police are
not entitled, according to the consistent practice
of the Reichsgericht"0 which still today is acknowledged without reserve, to arrest the suspect
against his will, to march him to the police station,
or otherwise make any restraint on his liberty,
be it only by holding him on the street.
(b) Questioning of suspects
The police-in pursuit of their duty established
in Section 163, CCP, to investigate criminal
offenses-may question suspects who are at large,
or volunteer to an interrogation, or are in legal
custody. But in the absence of a legal basis, they
cannot force a suspect at large into appearing
before them for an interrogation, or into being
interrogated on the street or elsewhere, unless
the qualifications of Section 127, CCP, which
justify his preliminary arrest, are fulfilled. Apart
from this, the suspect can always obstruct his
interrogation by using his privilege of silence."
(c) Physical examination of suspects
Section 81a, CCP, provides for the physical
examination or blood-testing of suspects. A mere,
that is, "reasonable", suspicion of an offense is
sufficient for the ascertainment of facts relevant to
' See 34 Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts in
Strafsachen 446; 65 id. 392; 69 id. .312.
9See 34 Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts in
Strafsachen 446.
1027 Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts in Strafsachen 155; 32 id. 271; 38 id. 374; and 59 id. 114.
n As regards the interrogation of the suspect by the
police, see Clemens, The Privilege Against Self-Incr.minolion (Germany), 51 J. Cn. L., C., &. P.S.
172 (1960). This question also will be dealt with in a

report concerning "Police Interrogation Privileges and
Limitations" which will appear subsequently in
this JOURNAL.
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the issue. Bodily interferences by a doctor as well
as the taking of blood-tests without the consent of
the suspect are admissible only if there are no
grounds for an apprehension that they might
result in detriments to his health.
Further, Section 81d, CCP, provides for the
physical examination of a woman, irrespective of
her consent, to be made by a woman or a doctor,
and for the calling in, on request, of a woman or
next-of-kin, if the examination might hurt the
sense of shame of the woman to be examined.
Orders of such nature are in principle reserved
to the judge. Only in cases where the success of the
investigation is endangered through delay, the
district attorney and especially qualified police
officers (namely members of the Criminal Police)
are entitled to take appropriate action in their
own right. This will always apply in a traffic
accident, if an alcohol-test is required from a
suspect, because the alcohol will soon be eliminated
from the body and hence cease to serve as evidence
for the suspected offenses.
(d) Taking of fingerprints, photos, etc., from
suspects
Section 81b, CCP, authorizes the police---as
well as the judge and the district attorney-to
take photos, fingerprints, measurements and
similar evidence from a suspect even against his
will to the extent that this will serve the purpose
of furthering the prosecution or establishing his
identity.
(e) Searches against the suspect
Searches against the suspect (which include his
frisking) can only be ordered by a judge; in the
case of imminent danger, however, the district
attorney and specially qualified police officers
(namely members of the Criminal Police) can
also effect them (see Article 13(i) of the Basic
Law, as well as Section 105(i), CCP). The details
of searches against suspects are laid down in
Sections 102 et. seq., CCP. The most important12
provisions are Sections 102 and 104, CCP.
Section 102 provides for the admissibility of a
read:
"Section 102. A search of the abode and of other
rooms as well as of the person, and of the personal
belongings can be effected against anybody who is
under suspicion as perpetrator of the crime or accomplice thereto before or after the fact or as a receiver.
The search can be made for the purpose of his apprehension or in the event that there are reasonable grounds
to assume that it will result in the discovery of evidence.
"Section 104. (i) During night-time the dwellings,
the business premises and the fenced-in property must
12They
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search against a suspect in general, while Section
104 imposes restrictions on the search in regard
to the time during which the search of rooms and
fenced-in property, the so-called house-search, is
admissible.
It appears noteworthy that a search is permitted
where there is mere suspicion-that means "reasonable suspicion"--whereas arrest presupposes
"strong suspicion."
(f) Impounding against suspects
The admissibility of impoundings which constitute a restraint of property and therefore,
under Article 14(ii) of the Basic Law, are permissible only on the strength of a law, is governed
by Sections 94 to 101, CCP. The most important
provision" is Section 94 which says that objects
which may be of importance as exhibits for the
investigation will be taken into custody or otherwise safeguarded, and that impounding is necessary
if the objects are in the custody of an other person
and are not surrendered voluntarily. To order
impoundings against the suspect is principally
reserved to the judge; only in the case of imminent
danger are the district attorney and the members
of the Criminal Police allowed to effect them (see
Section 98(i), CCP). Sections 95 to 97, CCP, are
not applicable to impoundings against the suspect.
Sections 99 to 101 provide for the impounding oT
mails coming from, or addressed to, the suspect;
they are without importance for the purposes of
this report, as such actions can be effected by the
judge or district attorney only, and never by the
police.
It must be pointed out that also an impounding
against the suspect requires only "reasonable"
rather than "strong" suspicion.
POLIcE RIGHTS AND DurrEs IN TI
OF CRIM

PREVENTION

The preventive function of the police is dealt
with in the police statutes of the Lnder rather
be entered only in hot pursuit or in case of danger or in
case of the capture of an escaped person.
(ii) This restriction will not apply to dwellings of
persons who are under police supervision or to rooms
which during night-time are accessible to everybody or
which are known to the police as shelters or meetingplaces of persons with previous convictions, as a deposit for objects received by means of criminal acts
or as hiding-places for gambling or prostitution.
Within the period from April 1st to September
(iii)
30th the night-time covers the hours beginning 9 o'clock
p.m. and ending 4 o'clock a.m., and within the period
from October 1st to March 31st the hours beginning
9 o'clock p.m. and ending 6 o'clock a.m."
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than in the CCP, which covers only repressive
police measures. Their legal ground is afforded by
Sections 14 and 15 of the former Prussian Police
Administration Act, dated June 1, 1931, which
enable the police to take action to ward off dangers
threatening public security and order.1 3
These provisions are in force in all Linder of the
Federal Republic of Germany, partly on the
strength of statutes of the same or similar tenor enacted subsequent to 1945, partly as common law
which was valid long before 1931. Naturally, the
dividing line between a preventive action of the
police on the strength of the said provisions, and
a repressive action under the provisions of the CCP
is blurred. This becomes obvious especially in the
cases of raids. Provided all the persons who are
arrested and frisked on this occasion are under
strong suspicion, their arrest and their frisking is
covered by the provision of the CCP. However,
the problem of such raids lies in the very fact that
not only strongly suspected persons but also
law-abiding and unsuspected individuals, who
under the CCP are not subject to arrest and
searching, are subjected to arrest and frisking.
Nevertheless, it is the common belief in Germany
that on the strength of the above-quoted provisions
such round-ups are permitted as a preventive police
measure.
Hence, the Reichsgericht held in a decision
rendered in 1906 that the police were authorized
to frisk some coal miners for weapons. 1' A few in
fact carried weapons and had already shot at and
wounded other people. In the opinion of the
Reichsgericht, the frisking was necessary to
"These provisions read:
"Section 14. (i) The police authorities shall, within
the limits of the existing laws, take the necessary
action to ward off, from the public or the individual,
dangers threatening public security and order.
(ii) Moreover the police authorities will perform
such duties as have been especially assigned to them
by law.
"Section 15. (i) The police are authorized to take
persons into police custody only if such measure is
necessary
(a) for the protection of such persons
(b) to remove a disturbance of public safety or
order which has already occurred, or to avoid an
imminent danger subject to public action if the
removal of such disturbance or the avoidability
of such danger is not otherwise possible.
(ii) The persons taken into police custody must,
except in cases of publicly dangerous mentally disordered individuals, be released from police custody
during the course of the following day at the latest.
(iii) The above provisions will not apply in extradition and expulsion cases."
14See 39 Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts in
Strafsachen 192.

prevent further illegal use of fire-arms and thus
remove a public menace.
Similar considerations played their part in
German courts in the years following the Second
World War. At that time the police-often by
order of the Military Government-were searching
the baggage of railway and motor-car travelers
with a view to detecting and impounding victuals
that had been acquired contrary to the rationing
regulations. Undoubtedly in such cases the
statutory prerequisites of Section 102, CCP, and
following, do not apply in regard to all searched
travelers, because there were no reasonable grounds
to assume that all of them were under the suspicion
of rationing offenses.
Even so, the courts ruled such measures to be
legal because they were necessary to prevent the
food supply of the population from being jeopardized. However, in areas where no "black
market" existed such searching was held to be
15
illegal.
This broad interpretation of the preventive
functions of the police will certainly give rise to
objections on the part of liberal observers, because it tends to further a far-reaching undermining
of well-considered safeguards embodied in the CCP
in connection with the repressive activities of the
police.
CONCLUSION

In the light of the foregoing observations on the
rights of the police in the prosecution and prevention of crimes, the four questions posed for discussion in connection with this topic16 can under
German Law be answered as follows:
(1) In the absence of a legal basis, police suspicion alone does not entitle the police to stop a
person on the street and question him as to his
identity and reason for being where he is, unless
he consents to his being questioned. On the contrary, such repressive measures are permitted
only in the event of a preliminary arrest based
upon "strong suspicion," as that term is used in
the CCP. As preventive measures they are justified,
though, if they are necessary to ward off from the
public such dangers as are threatening public
security and order. This however, will occur only
on rare occasions.
(2) "On the street" searches for weapons or
incriminating evidence can only be made by the
15
As far as can be traced here, the decisions bearing
on 1 the matter have not been published.
The four questions are set forth in the opening
paragraph of Professor Remington's paper, which
appears at the beginning of this symposium.
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police upon "reasonable" suspicion, which, as
mentioned before, is less than "strong" suspicion,
the requisite to an arrest.
As a preventive police measure, however,
searches are confined to the rare occasions where
they appear necessary to avoid a public danger.
(3) There is no need of curtailing the powers
of the police in the execution of their repressive
activities. The regulation so far has proved a
success. Curtailing the powers vested in the police
under the present law would intolerably paralyze
their striking power.
However, a more precise regulation of the preventive powers of the police, in particular the
permissibility of raids, would be a matter worth
considering. Under normal conditions they should
be permitted only for clearing out hiding places of
criminals and, in politically turbulent times, for
the prevention of riots and other disturbances. It
would appear advisable to enact a law which
reserves the order for a raid to the judge only and
subjects the judge to the above requirements.
(4) There is also no need of broadening the
statutory powers justifying a police arrest, repressive or preventive, all the less as this would mean a
relapse into the foul practices of the Nazi police
state which thought nothing of personal freedom.
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That state had expanded by a law enacted in 193517
the requisites for an arrest and therewith also of a
preliminary arrest on the part of the police.
Under that law a suspect could also be arrested
for fear he might abuse his liberty to commit new
criminal acts, and further, if in consideration of
the serious nature of his crime and the public
resentment aroused thereby, leaving him at
liberty appeared intolerable. The second requirement for an arrest obviously originated in
typical Nazi-trains of thought and was repealed
as early as 1945. The first requirement was
abolished in 1950 in the course of an amendment of
the CCP,8 because it was justly felt that this
requirement of an arrest could not be reconciled
with the principles of a constitutional system and
with the basic right of the freedom of the person.
17Article 5 des Gesetzes zur Anderung der Vorschriften des Strafverfahrens und des Gerichtsverfassungsgesetzes (Law for the Amendment of the Provisions respecting Criminal Procedure and the Court
Constitution Law, dated June 28, 1935).
19Article 3, No. 44, des Gesetzes zur Wiederherstellung der Rechtseinheit auf dem Gebiete der Gerichtsverfassung, der birgerlichen Rechtspflege, des Strafverfahrens und des Kostenrechts vom 12.9.50 (Law
dated September 12, 1950 on the Restoration of Legal
Unity in the Field of Court Constitution, Administration of Civil and Criminal Justice and Law Costs).

E. Israel
HAIM H. COHN*

Under Israel law, a police officer may arrest any
person without warrant when he has reasonable
grounds for believing that that person has committed a felony;' or when that person has in his
presence, or has recently, 2 committed an offence
punishable with imprisonment for a period exceeding six months; or when that person commits,
or is accused before him of having committed, an
offence, or when he believes on reasonable grounds
that that person has committed an offence, and
that person refuses to give his name and address
or has no known or fixed abode. Likewise, he may
*Justice, Supreme Court of Israel. Additional
biographical data may be found in 51 J. CxwL L.,
C.& P.S. 175 (1960).
1 A felony is an offence punishable with imprisonment exceeding three years: CRBINAL CODE ORDINANCE
§5 (Palestine 1936), and Interpretation Ordinance §1.
2
"Recently" has been held to mean immediately
after the commission of the offence: 11 Pesakim
Mekhouziyim (District Court Judgments) 253.

arrest without warrant a person obstructing him
while in the execution of his duty, or who has
escaped, or attempts to escape, from lawful
custody, or who is pursued by hue and cry. Finally,
a police officer may arrest without warrant a
person found in suspicious circumstances, taking
precautions to conceal himself or having no
ostensible means of subsistence and unable to give
a satisfactory account of himself.
The powers vested in police officers may be
conferred on any public officer designated by the
Minister of Justice' and have been so conferred on
port inspectors, road traffic inspectors, and officers
in charge of investigations into black-marketeering
offences.
3Section 3(1), CR11INAL. PRocEDuRE (ARREsT
AND SEARcHESS) ORnnNA;cE §3(1), LAws OF PAL sTINE cap. 33.

4 Id. J3(3).
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Special powers to arrest without a warrant are
given to customs officers and police officers where
they have reasonable ground to believe that a
person is committing, or attempting to commit, or
being concerned in the commission of, any smuggling offences;.5 and to police officers where the
driver of a vehicle commits a driving offence
within his view and fails to give his name and
address or to produce his driving licence on
6
demand.
As to a person who is about to commit an offence
but has not yet committed it, it is a misdemeanour
punishable with two years' imprisonment to fail to
use all reasonable means to prevent the commission
or completion of a felony, where it is known that a
felony is designed to be committed The reasonable means to prevent the felonious act may
include, or consist of, the arrest of the would-be
offender without a warrant. But the Supreme
Court has ruled that this provision "imposes a
duty on every person to act only where that
persons knows that another designs to commit a
felony. 'Knows' means what it says: you do not
know that which you only conclude, however,
reasonably, from the circumstances.... ,,
In many cases arrests by police officers were
held unlawful where the statutory powers of
arrest had been exceeded. Thus, an inferior court
is reported to have held that where a police officer
in whose presence the offence of soliciting for
immoral purposes9 had been committed notified
the offender that he was arresting her, and only
afterwards asked her for her name and address
and, when she refused, asked her to accompany
him to the police station-the arrest and all
subsequent proceedings were unlawful. 10 And
where a police officer would have been justified in
arresting a person for a felony he actually had
committed, but on arresting him told him by
mistake that he was being arrested on a charge
involving a misdemeanour only (as distinguished
from a felony), the arrest was held unlawful by the
Supreme Count, as the offence had not been
committed in the officer's presence, and in respect
5

Cusroms ORDINANCE §193, LAWS OF PALESTINE

cap. 42.

6ROAD

TRANSPORT

PALESII=
cap. 128.
7

ORDINANCE

§19,

LAWS

OF

§33 (Palestine 1936).
8 Frenkel v. Attorney-General, 5 Piskei Din 1602,
1606 (1951).
9Punishbable with one month's imprisonment only:
CRnMNcAL CODE ORDINANCE §167 (Palestine 1936).
10Reported in I ISRAEL POLICE QUARTERLY 56
(in Hebrew).
CRna;AL CODE ORDINANCE

of the misdemeanour he had no power of arrest
unless it was committed in his presence."
A police officer effecting an arrest may search
the arrested person, or cause him to be searched,
and may take from him any offensive weapons
which he has about his person. 12 Where the police
officer is not empowered to arrest without a
warrant, he is not entitled to search any person
except on a warrant of search (or, of course, a
3
warrant of arrest).1
It is an offence punishable with one month's
imprisonment (or, in the case of subsequent offences after previous convictions of the same
offence, with one year's imprisonment) for any
person to behave in a disorderly or indecent manner in any public place; or to conduct himself in
any public place in a manner likely to cause a
breach of the peace; or to be found wandering in
any public place at such time and under such
circumstances as to lead to the conclusion that he
is there for an illegal or disorderly purpose. 4 As
subsequent offences are punishable with imprisonment exceeding six months, a police officer may
arrest without a warrant a recidivist offender of
this kind, and police have tried to exercise their
power of arrest under this provision in respect of
known prostitutes found in the streets. It has,
however, been held by the Supreme Court that it is
not sufficient that circumstances are such as to
lead to the conclusion that the person arrested was
there for an illegal or disorderly purpose; but under
the statute both the "circumstances" and the
"time" of his being found wandering must lead to
that conclusion; and where the time is a time of
day or -evening where streets are normally and
generally frequented, no such conclusion may be
5
drawn.
Apart from the power to arrest without warrant,
every police officer has the power "to require any
person whom he has reasonable grounds for believing to have committed any offence, to furnish
him with his name and address, and may require
such person to accompany him to the police
station, and, if the person refuses to accompany
him, he may arrest him."' 6 Even this right to
1Attorney-Generl v. Kedoshim, 10 Piskei Din
972, 976 (1956).
2 CRnonAL PROCEDuRE (ARREST AND SEARES)
ORDINANCE
§11(1), LAWS OF PALEsTN cap. 33.
3

1 1d., §§13, 16.

14CRII9NAL CODE ORDINANCE §193
IsFRENX EL v. Attorney-General,

(Palestine 1936).
op. ci. supra

note 8 at .1611.
16CRUMINAL PROCEDJRE (ARREST AND SEARCHES)
ORDINANCE §3(2), LAWS OF PALESINE cap. 33.
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stop and question a person as to his identity and
abode is thus confined to criminal offenders or
persons reasonably believed to have committed
an offence, and in the absence of such belief or of
reason for such belief, a person may not be stopped
and questioned by a police officer except to give "a
satisfactory account of himself" where he was
found in suspicious circumstances, taking precautions to conceal himself, or has no ostensible
means of subsistence. As a matter of practice, no
person is stopped and questioned by police in
Israel except in the small hours of the night where
the behaviour of the person in the street arouses
suspicion; and no case is reported in which the
conduct of the police in stopping and questioning
such persons, or in arresting persons who could not
give a satisfactory account of themselves, has
given rise to any complaints.
The opinion generally prevailing in Israel is that
the law as it stands (although of British origin
and enacted by the Mandatory Government of
Palestine7), and as interpreted by the Israel judiciary, is not in need of revision or reform. The police
do not claim that the powers of arrest and questioning vested in them, however restricted they are
and however restrictively they are interpreted, are
not sufficient to enable them to provide the public
with adequate police protection. Hence the question has not arisen, and is not in the near future
likely to arise, in this country, whether police
should be permitted to arrest, search or question
people in the streets in circumstances which are
not covered by existing legislation.
It appears arguable, however, that the existing
law stands in need of simplification. While the
commission of an offence, or the loitering in suspicious circumstances, coupled with either precautions to conceal himself or lack of ostensible means
of subsistence, might be retained as minimum
conditions precedent to a police officer stopping a
person in the street and requiring his identification,
it is submitted that whether the offence committed
was a felony or a misdemeanour, or whether it was
punishable with imprisonment up to or exceeding
six months, should be irrelevant for the determination of the question whether it should be permissible for a police officer to effect an arrest without
warrant. Moreover, this existing test presupposes
17The police powers in Palestine and Israel in this
respect are, however, much more limited than the
powers conferred on police officers by the law of England: See AacanoLD's PLADNG, EVIDENCE AND
PRACTICE IN CRIMNAL CAsEs 1076 (34th ed. 1959).
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that every police officer knows by heart the measures of punishment prescribed for each and every
offence-an erudition which, even if it exists in a
police officer, appears to be quite unnecessary. It
is suggested that the law should be that a police
officer may arrest without warrant any person
committing an offence in his presence, where the
officer has reasonable grounds to believe that
failing such arrest the person could not be brought
to justice or would endanger public safety or cause
a breach of peace. Where the identity of the offender is known and there is no immediate danger
from him if he is left at large, there is no reason
why a warrant for his arrest should not first be
obtained, however long the term of imprisonment
to which he may ultimately be liable; and, on the
other hand, where the offence was of a light nature
(e.g., conducting himself in a manner likely to
cause a breach of the peace), but in all the circumstances the officer reasonably concludes that
violence is likely to ensue unless he arrests forthwith, there is no valid reason why he should not
have the power to arrest without a warrant. In
many-if not in most-cases, the nature of the
offence committed will afford prima facie indication as to whether the apprehension of immediate
danger is justified; in the same way, the nature and
gravity of the offence will in most cases indicate
whether the offender is likely to escape from
justice. But the considerations prompting-and
justifying-a police officer to effect an arrest should
be police considerations, properly within his province, and whether he acts rightly or wrongly will
depend upon the exercise of a discretion which, as
a police officer, he is qualified and trained to
exercise, and not upon his knowledge, or lack of
knowledge, of detailed and complicated provisions
of hundreds of criminal statutes.
To sum up de legeferenda:
1) The police may not stop and ask any person
in any public place to identify, or give an
account of, himself, excepta) where that person has committed an offence in the presence of the officer or is
reasonably believed by the officer to have
committed an offence; or
b) where that person was found in circumstances which reasonably caused suspicion
that he was there for an illegal or disorderly purpose, and either took precautions
to conceal himself or had no ostensible
means of subsistence;
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and in any such case the officer may require
such person to accompany him to the nearest
police station.
2) The police may not arrest any person without
warrant of a competent judicial officer,
excepta) where an offence was committed, and there
are reasonable grounds to apprehend that
unless arrested forthwith, the person
suspected of the offence may commit a
further offence or otherwise endanger
public order, or that he may attempt to

prevent his being brought to justice; or
b) where a police officer is obstructed while
in the execution of a duty; or
c) where the person to be arrested has escaped, or attempts to escape, from lawful
custody, or is pursued by hue and cry; or
d) where a police officer has, in lawful exercise of his powers under subparagraph 1,
above, required the person to be arrested
to accompany him to the police station,
and that person refused to do so.

F. Japan*
HARUO ABE**
POLICE ARREST STATUTES IN GENERAL

The Japanese Code of Criminal Procedure of
19481 is the general source of law controlling the
police arrest procedure. Under the general law a
warrant issued by a judge is necessary for an
arrest. 2 This is an application of the basic principle
of Japanese criminal procedure that the exercise of
investigative power upon persons or things having
evidentiary value shall be generally subject to
judicial control in the form of warrants for arrest
or search and seizure. This "warrant principle" is
* A brief historical note concerning the Japanese
legal system, which may be helpful in better understanding certain portions of this paper, appears in
51 J. Cam. L., C. & P.S. 178-80 (1960).
The author gratefully acknowledges the encouragement and advice of Professors Fred E. Inbau and
Claude R. Sowle in preparing this article for publication. The author also wishes to express his appreciation
to Miss Ruth E. McKee of the American Embassy,
Tokyo, who has been kind enough to refine the English
and give him valuable advice on linguistic matters.
*. Public Prosecutor, Ministry of Justice, Tokyo.
Additional biographical data may be found in 51
J. Cmm. L., C. & P.S. 178 (1960).
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Con

OF CRn4AL PROCEDURE (Law No.

131 of 1948, with the latest amendment by Law
No.
2 108 of 1958).
Tm CODE oF CMBnIAL PROCEDURE, art. 199,
par. 1: "Where there exists any reasonable ground
sufficient to suspect that an offense has been committed
by the suspect, a public prosecutor, public prosecutor's
assistant officer or judicial police official may arrest
him upon a warrant of arrest issued in advance by a
judge; provided, however, that for the offenses punishable with a fine not exceeding 500 yen [which in most
cases should read as 25,000 yen-autlwr], penal detention or mhinor fine, such arrest may be effected only
in cases where the suspect has no fixed dwelling or
where he fails, without good reason, to comply with the
request for appearance which has been made in accordance with the preceding Article."

a basic requirement of the pertinent provisions of
the Constitution. 3
However, it should be noted here that there are
two important exceptions to the principle of
"arrest with warrant."
One of them is the rule that any person may
arrest, without warrant, an offender who is committing or has just committed a crime in his
presence. 4 This exceptional rule is basically
declared by Article 33 of the Japanese Constitution, which indicates that the offender may be
exceptionally arrested without warrant, if he is
arrested for genko-harn (offense being committed or
flagrant d6lit).5 The concept of genko-han as used in
the Constitution has been interpreted as com3
THE CONSTITUTION Or JAPAN, art. 31: "No person
shall be deprived of life or liberty, nor shall any criminal
penalty be imposed, except according to procedure
establshed by law."
Ibid., art. 33: "No person shall, be apprehended
except upon warrant issued by a competent judicial
officer which specifies the offense with which the
person is charged, unless he is apprehended, the offense
being committed." ["...
. unless he is apprehended, the
offense being committed" means "... unless he is
apprehended in the act of committing the offense."author].
Ibid., art. 35: "The right of all persons to be secure
in their homes, papers and effects against entries,
searches and seizures shall not be impaired except upon
warrant issued for adequate cause and particularly
describing the place to be searched and things to
be seized, or except as provided by Art. 33.
"Each search or seizure shall be made upon separate
warrant
issued by a competent judicial officer."
4
TnE CODE Or CznEnAL PaOCEDURE, art. 213:
"Any person whosoever may arrest a genko-hannin
without warrant."
r For the English translation of art. 33 of the Constitution see note 3, supra.
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prising the offense which has just been committed
7

and the "quasi genko-han."

The second of the exceptions is the rule that an
investigating official may arrest the suspect without warrant if he has sufficient grounds for believing that the latter has committed any of
certain types of serious crimes and if, in addition,
there is no time to procure a warrant.8 This is socalled the system of "urgent arrest." In the case
of urgent arrest, however, a warrant must be
procured soon afterwards. 9 There have been a few
cases where the constitutionality of this exceptional
rule has been challenged, but the majority of
theories and the judicial precedents have supported
the constitutionality of the system of urgent
arrest. 10 I do not entirely agree with the reasons
for which the Supreme Court justified the system
of urgent arrest," but I am of the opinion that the
system is constitutional, because Article 33 of the
6Tim CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, art. 212,
par. 1: "genko-hannin [i.e., l'agent du flagrant dditauthor] shall be defined as a person who is committing
or has just committed an offense."
7Ibid., art. 212, par. 2: "If any person who falls
under one of the following items is found under circumstances which indicate dearly that an offense has
just been committed, he shall be deemed a genko-hannin:
(1) A person being pursued with hue and cry; (2) a
person carrying with him illgotten goods, or weapons
or other objects apparently used in connection with
the offense; (3) a person bearing on his body or clothes
visible traces of the offense; and, (4) a person who attempts
to run away when asked to identify himself."
8
1bid., art. 210, par. 1: "When there are sufficient
grounds to suspect the commission of an offense punishable by the death penalty, or imprisonment with or
without forced labor for life or for a maximum period
of three years or more, and if, in addition, because of
great urgency a warrant of arrest cannot be obtained
beforehand from a judge, a public prosecutor, a public
prosecutor's assistant officer or a judicial police official
may, upon statement of the reasons therefor, apprehend
the suspect- in such cases, measures for obtaining
a warrant of arrest from a judge shall be immediately
taken. If a warrant of arrest is not issued the suspect
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Constitution, whose basic idea was adopted from
the Anglo-American legal system, should be
interpreted to presuppose such traditional exceptions to the warrant principle as have been historically justified in Anglo-American common
2

law.'

It has frequently been suggested that in the
United States the percentage of arrests without
warrant or of illegal arrests is quite high.13 Fortunately, however, the rate of arrests without warrant has not been very high in Japan according to
statistics. 4 This may be one of the psychological
reasons why the argument against the constitutionality of the "urgent arrest" has not become
very popular among Japanese lawyers.

TnE POLICE PRIVILEGES TO STOP AND QUESTION
A SUSPICIOUS PERSON

In the absence of sufficient grounds for an arrest,
should the police have a right to stop and question
a person on the street as to his identity and reason
for being where he is, if the appearance or conduct
of that person has reasonably aroused police
suspicion? Under the Japanese law, this question
is answered in the affirmative with some statutory
restrictions. The Police Duty Law, 5 which is the

sole statute controlling this aspect of police
practice, authorizes a police officer "to stop and
question a person whom the officer, judging
. Itshould be noted here that in the majority of
American jurisdictions the system of arrest without a
warrant prevails to a great extent.
,3See, e.g., Foote, Tort Remedies for Police Violations
of Individual Rights, 39 MINN.L. REv. 493 n.1 (1955);
Note, Philadelphia Police Practice and the Law of
Arrest, 100 U. PA. L. REv. 1182, 1183 n. 13 (1952).
" See, e.g., the following table extracted from
ARREST,DETENTION AND RELEASE ON

BAIL 4 (Yoko-

gawa ed., Tokyo, 1958) (in Japanese):
Number of Suspects Arrested by Police in 1956
Arrest

must be released immediately."

in the

9Ibid. This is a system of judicial control post

act of
Corn-

facto.

10For the leading case, see Vol. 9, No. 13 Sup. Ct.

Crim
Rep. 2760 (Grand Bench 1955).
11
In the Supreme Court decision cited in note 10,
supra, the opinion of the Court stated in substance that
the system of arrest without warrant in such a limited

form was not repugnant to the spirit of the Constitution. This is nothing but replacing one question with
another. One of the two supplementary opinions
maintained that art. 33 of the Constitution, as well
as the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, excluded reasonable arrest or search and
seizure from the cases where warrants were required.
The other made practical necessity the grounds for
justification. Neither is satisfactory. For further
discussion, see ARREST, DETENTION AND RELEASE ON
BAIL 52-58 (Yokogawa ed., Tokyo, 1958) (in Japanese).

Total

Not

Arrest

with

mitting
Urgent the Jff-

Suspects Arrested Warrant Arrests* ense
Offense against
Penal Code

565,517 295,613123,85133,960 112.093
('00%) (52. %) (21.9%) (6.0%) (19.8%)

Offense
against 2,419,042
2,373,35912,268
Speciallaws

Total

(100%)

660 33.055

(98 1%) (0.5%) (0.03%)

(1.4%)

2,984,550
2 668,672136,119 34,620145,148
(100%) (89.3%) (4.6%)

(1.2%) (4.90)

Itshould alsobe noted that almost 100% of urgent arrests
have been justified
by the subsequent issuance of arrest
warrants.

IsPOLIcE DUTY LAW (Law No. 136, 1948, with the

latest amendment by Law No. 163, 1954).
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reasonably from his unusual conduct and/or
other circumstances, has sufficient ground for
suspecting to have committed or to be about to
commit a crime."' 16 In consideration of possible
embarrassment of the subject person or the possible disturbance to the traffic, the officer may ask
the subject person to come to a nearby police
station or police box for further questioning. 17 This,
of course, does not mean that compulsion may be
used for detention or questioning.2
Statistics indicate that the "on the street"
questioning is contributing considerably toward
the successful detection of crime.19 It would be wise
to keep the efficiency of this practice at the
present level rather than revert to the pre-war
practice of "on the street" questioning which was
efficient enough to infringe upon the privacy of
citizens. There have been no adequate data
available regarding the post-war practice of "on
the street" questioning except for the very limited
16Ib&, art 2, par. 1: "A police officer is authorized
to stop and question any person whom the officer,
judging reasonably from his unusual conduct and/or
other circumstances, has sufficient ground for suspecting to have committed or to be about to commit a
crime, or who appears to have knowledge about a
crime which has been committed or is about to be
committed."
7Ibid., art. 2, par. 2: "When the police officer considers that questioning the subject person on the spot
as prescribed in thepreceding paragraph may be to
the disadvantage of the subject person or disturb the
traffic, the officer may ask the person to come to a
nearby police station, police box or residential police
box8 for questioning."
' lbid., art. 2, par. 3: "No person mentioned in the
preceding two paragraphs shall be detained or forced
to come to the police box or reident . police box or
compelled to answer questicns ag'nst his will, except
in accordance with the provisions of laws concerning
criminal procedure."
1"The following table was constructed upon the data
obtained from NATIONAL PouicE AGENCY, CRnu-AL
STATisTICs POR 1958, 174-175 (1959).
Penal Code Offenses Investigated by the Police as
Classified by Causes Leading to Investigation
(1958)
Total Cases ............................
Criminal Interrogation ..................
Information Obtained by Detectives ......
Private Information ....................
Offense Committed in the Presence of Other
Persons .............................
"Duty Law" Questioning.................
Stolen Goods ..........................
Complaint by Victim ..................
Arrest by Private Person ................
Self-Surrender ...................
......
Third Person Accusation ................
M odus Operandi .......................
Personal Identification ..................
Finger Print ...........................
Other Cases ...........................

902,316
383,981
149,255
152,795
69,343
33,517
33,334
26,096
9,213
7,744
3,219
3,214
2,825
1,612
26,168

data obtained by a pilot investigation into this
matter. 0
In principle, no physical power or compulsion
shall be used in stopping and questioning under
the Police Duty Law. However, there may be some
cases where reasonable physical force must be used
to stop a subject person who tries to avoid the
questioning in an unreasonable manner. For
example, a suspicious person may intentionally
disregard the request of a police officer who wants
to stop him in a lawful manner; or a suspicious
person walking along a back street with a suspicious package may take flight when he is asked to
stop. In such unusual cases it shall be lawful for
the police to exercise the minimum amount of
physical power needed to stop the person, such as
following the person and crying out, "Stop a
moment, please," or stopping him by standing in
his way, touching him on the shoulder or grasping
him by the arm." This position has been substantially supported by High Court decisions." The
20 From Nov. 18 to 23, 1959, a survey of "on the
street" questioning was made by a police station
having jurisdiction over a police ward located in the
heart of Tokyo. The day and night population of the
area was 300,000 and 40,000 respectively; 9 police
boxes with 30 policemen guarded and patrolled the
area. The survey revealed among others the following
facts: 98 were questioned; more than half of them were
questioned from 10 p.m. to 2 a.m.; in most cases 10
minutes were used for each questioning; with regard
to attitudes, 10 of the questioned persons were "uncooperative"; in majority of cases other measures in
addition to questioning (e.g., touching a package from
outside) were taken; in 3 cases the questioning led to
obtaining incriminating evidence (physical or testimonial); in 94 cases suspicion was cleared; dispositions
made were as follows: 95 released (including 6 taken
to police boxes for questioning), 2 taken to the police
station, and 1 arrested.
"1Cf. NATIONAL PoLicE AGENCY, PoLicE MA-uAL
FOR FiELn Woax 128 (3d ed. 1957) (in Japanese);
NATIONAL PoucE AGENCY, PRACTCE n QUtsnornING
MMER THE PoucE Duty LAW 17 (1958) (in Japanese).

"Vol. 5, No. 12 High Courts Crim. Rep. 2294
(Sapporo High Court 1952). Prosecution for beating
over the face of a police officer who allegedly was
engaging in official duty. The issue was on the legality
of the act of the officer who grasped the defendant by
the shoulder to stop him for further questioning when
he tried to take flight under suspicious circumstances.
The defendant appealed from the judgment of the
district court which held against him. The high Court
held that the officer's act of grasping the suspicious
person by the shoulder when he tried to escape without
answering the question was within the scope of lawful
performance of official duty under the Police Duty Law.
Supp. No. 33 High Courts Crim. Rep. 47 (Nagoya
High Court 1953). Prosecution for kicking and injuring
a police officer who allegedly was engaging in official
duty under the Police Duty Law. The police officer
noticed four suspicious persons, one of whom was the
defendant, conferring at a dark corner of a park at
about 9:00 p.m. Three of them stated their names when
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view of Professor Dando of Tokyo University also
appears to be compatible with these decisions?3

evidence? Under the Japanese law this question has
been answered in the negative.

TnE POLICE PRIVILEGE TO SEARCH A SUSPECTED
PERSON FOR WEAPONS OR FOR INCRIMINATING
EVIDENCE

warrant is one of the indispensable conditions for
compulsory search and seizure made on a person
by the police.24 The sole exception to this rule is
found in Article 22025 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, which provides in substance that a
person suspected by the police may, on the spot
of arrest and without a warrant, be searched and
subjected to seizure of dubious articles carried on
his person. This implies that, except on the occa-

As stated above, under the Japanese system the

If, in the absence of sufficient grounds for an
arrest, the police have a right to stop and question
a suspected person under certain suspicious circumstances, should the police be permitted to search
such a person for weapons or for incriminating
asked. But the defendant refused to state his name and
to open a suspicious package he carried. The officer
touched the package from outside and felt something
like a lady's handbag. When the defendant was asked
to open the package, he refused to do so and started to
run away with the package. The officer pursued him
and reached him when he stumbled and fell down.

Then, the defendant, lying on the ground kicked and

hurt the officer when the latter tried to approach the
former. The District Court held that the officer had
no right to pursue the defendant when he ran. The
prosecution appealed from the judgment for the defendant. The High Court held that an officer should
have the right as well as duty to pursue a suspected person if he took flight when questioned and, therefore,
the officer was engaging in official duty in a lawful
manner. The judgment below was reversed and a new
judgment was rendered against the defendant.
Supp. No. 33 High Courts Crim. Rep. 58-64 (Nagoya
High Court 1953). Prosecution for beating, kicking and
injuring a police officer who allegedly was engaging
in official duty under the Police Duty Law. At about a
quarter past 12 o'clock midnight, two officers noticed a
suspicious person, the defendant, approaching on a
bicycle. They stopped the defendant and took him with
his consent to the nearby police box for questioning.
After being questioned a short while, the defendant took
sudden flight. Another officer who was there by chance
pursued him about 130 meters, reached him from behind and caught him by the arm, crying "Why are you
running away?" At that moment the defendant turned
around and started to beat him over the head and to
kick him. The District Court held that the act of the
Officer was "arresting" and beyond the limit of lawful

performance of duty under the Police Duty Law, and
that the defendant was not guilty, having made a
lawful counter-attack in self-defense against the unlawful attack by the officer (Nagoya District Court,
May 6, 1953; 1 HANRSi Jmo (Law Reports Times) 19
(1953).) The prosecution appealed from the judgment
of the District Court for the defendant. The High
Court held that under such circumstances it was

lawful for the officer to pursue and stop the defendant
by reasonable use of physical power, such as catching
the defendant by the arm while calling upon him to
stop. The judgment below was reversed and a new
judgment was rendered against the defendant.

The Limitations of Lawfulness of Police
2Dando,
Questioning under the Police Duty Law, 3 HtANI
Jiuo (Law Reports Times) 2 (1953). In this article

Professor Dando criticized the Nagoya District Court
decision, supra note 22, and suggested that at least it
would be lawful for a police officer to touch the body
of the subject person to draw his attention or to ask
his reconsideration.

sion of a lawful arrest, it is unlawful for the police

to search the suspected person who is stopped and
questioned under the Police Duty Law and seize
dubious articles carried on his person. Article 2,
paragraph 4, of the Police Duty Law specifically
provides that "If a person is under arrest in
accordance with laws concerning criminal procedure, a police officer is authorized to search the
person for a dangerous weapon." This is a restatement of the logical consequence of the established
rule of criminal procedure with specific regard to
dangerous weapons.

Under such a general prohibition of search and
seizure of the suspect, the police may not even
"frisk" him. This means that the police may not
even search the person by passing a hand over his
clothes or through his pockets. This, however, does
not necessarily mean that touching should be
absolutely prohibited. It should be permitted for
the police to touch the person or package, to a
reasonable extent, to fulfill the purpose of questioning. For example, he may pass his hand lightly
over the person's clothes or touch the outside of the
package he is carrying while asking such questions
as "What is this?" or "You appear to have something like a knife; will you let. me have a look at
2 'Ta

CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN,

art. 35 (for English

translation see note 3, supra); Tim CODE OF CmxnmAL
E, arts. 218, 219.
PROCEDU
2
'Art. 220:1. When a public prosecutor, a public

prosecutor's assistant officer or a judicial police official
arrests a suspect in accordance with Art. 199 or he
arrests a genko-hannin [a person who is committing or
has just committed a crime], he may, if necessary, take
the following measures; the same shall apply, if necessary, to the case where a suspect is arrested in accordance with Art. 210: (1) To enter the dwelling of aperson,
or the premises, building or vessels guarded by persons
to search for the suspect; (2) To seize, search or inspect
on the spot of the arrest. 2. The things seized shall
be returned immediately if a warrant of arrest is not
obtained in the case mentioned in the latter part
of the preceding paragraph. 3. For the measures mentioned in the first paragraph, a warrant need not be
obtained. 4. [Omitted]."
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it?"6 But no further search without consent should
be made.
LEGiTIMATE LIMITATIONS TO BE IMPOSED ON
POLICE

PRACTICES

STREET"

REGARDING

DETENTION,

"ON

QUESTIONING

THE

AND

FRISKING OF SUSPECTED PERSONS

Most Japanese lawyers appear to be satisfied
with the present status of limitations imposed
upon police practices by the provisions of the
Police Duty Law. However, a strong feeling of
dissatisfaction with these limitations has been
growing among the police and investigators. In
response to a growing demand for changing the
present situation, the National Police Agency
tried to add a new paragraph to Article 2 of the
Police Duty Law intended to safeguard the police
against dangerous weapons, proposing a bill for
partial amendments of the Police Duty Law in the
30th Diet Session in October, 1958. In the Diet
debate the National Police Agency pointed out
many cases where the lack of authority to search
for weapons had endangered the police or private
citizens and emphasized the necessity of such an
amendment.2
The pertinent provisions of what was intended
to be the new paragraph 3 of Article 2 read as
follows:
"3. If, on the occasion of questioning by a
police officer under Paragraph 1 of this Article,
the person, by unusual conduct or other circumstances, provides reasonable cause for being
suspected of having committed or being about
to commit a crime, or if he carries a dangerous
weapon or any other object that might endanger
the life or body of other persons, the police
officer may cause the person to submit the
article for temporary custody; or if the officer
recognizes that there is a reasonable ground for
2
6Cf., NATIONAL PouicE AGENCY, PRACCE IN
QUESTIONING

UNDER

TLE

POLICE

DUTY LAW

20

suspecting that the person is carrying such an
article, the officer may cause the person to
submit the personal effects carried by him for
inspection."
Of course this proposal did not mean that the
police should have the right to compel the subject
person to submit things he carries. It is obvious
that the person has the right to refuse to comply
with the officer's request even under this proposed
provision. Since even under the present law it is
lawful for the police reasonably to persuade the
suspected person to submit things he is carrying,
this proposal theoretically provides very little
enlargement of police authority. However, this
proposal of amendment was not very popular
among those people who are seriously concerned
with the protection of human rights. In theory the
proposal did not mean much; but in practice it
would allow the possibility of abusive exercise of
psychological compulsion on innocent citizens.
Among the opponents of the amendment there
seems to have been this feeling: Allow the police
seven miles and they will go nine miles; therefore,
if we want to keep them at seven miles, better
give them six miles. In any event, the Police Bill
as a whole-and it contained many points of
amendment-was very unpopular except among
certain conservative groups. The bill was vigorously counter-attacked 2 and automatically
quashed when the period of the Diet session expired
with the bill still pending in the House of Representatives. The basis for the opposition to the bill
was emotional fear of the probable misuse of enlarged authority, rather than a calculated possibility of mispractice; but there was some wisdom
in such distrust of the police. The bitter memory
of police brutality in pre-war Japan makes people
hesitant to enlarge police authority.
However, practical-minded persons who are
seeking for a realistic solution of the matter are
dissatisfied with the unrealistic and excessive
control of police practices. It is feared that excessive control may give rise to some undesirable
by-products, such as (1) excessive timidity on the
part of the police in fighting crimeg for the protec-

(1958) (in Japanese).
" The proposed bill contained several other points
of amendment which are designed to facilitate police
activities in many respects.
28One of the mimeographed materials prepared by
the National Police Agency contained many cases,
among which only two remarkable ones shall be men29
Almost the entire press was against the bill. It is
tioned here. Case A: A police officer questioning a
suspected person on the street was stabbed by the reported that about 66 liberal or "democratic" organizaperson with a concealed knife and died shortly after- tions throughout Japan declared their opposition to
wards. Case B: A police officer questioning a suspected
the bill. For pros and cons concerning the bill, see,
person had good reason to suspect that the person had e.g., Tsuchiya, Criticism of the Bill for the Partial
a dangerous weapon but could not request him to sub- Amendment to the Police Duty Law, 30 KErsATsU
mit it because of lack of authority to do so; while the KExNKxu (The Police Studies) 3, 22 (1959) (in Japanese)
officer continued questioning, he was stabbed in the Miyazawa, et al., Symposium on the Amendment to the
abdomen by the person with a concealed spring knife. Police Duty Law, 166 JUlRsT 2 (1958) (in Japanese).
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tion of society 0 and (2) a good excuse for the
clandestine practices of the police who try to
justify the evasion of legal restrictions on the
grounds that it is necessary for attaining a righteous purpose. The well-known police practice of
so-called "Youth Guidance" appears to be an
example of the latter phenomenon. Annually
more than 700,000 problem youths are "guided"
by the police with allegedly "free" consent on the
part of the youths. It is obvious that a great number
of problem youths who are not actually delinquent
are often stopped and questioned on the street and
sometimes are, as a matter of fact, psychologically
compelled to come to police boxes, notwithstanding
the fact that they do not actually fall under the
category of suspicious persons as prescribed by
paragraph 1 of Article 1 or fall under the category
of persons who shall be protected under Article 3
of the Police Duty Law.3 ' It is desirable that a
procedure for youth guidance should be dearly
prescribed and be subject to proper legal control.
FREEDOM OF THE POLICE AND FREEDOM OF
CITIZENS

It is said that under Anglo-American law arrest
is not the beginning but the end of criminal investigation. For a more exact statement, however, the
phase "is not" should be changed into "should not
be." Even under Anglo-American law most
criminal investigators and practical-minded
lawyers will admit that usually the most important
evidence is obtained by questioning the suspect
after the arrest.Y The problem is how to harmonize
the freedom of the police with the freedom of
citizens.
With respect to police arrest statutes, should
more freedom be granted to the police in recognition of the fact that existing laws hamper police
attempts to meet the public demand for adequate
police protection?
The key to the realistic solution of this problem
is the discipline of the police. In Japan it would be
30Similar apprehension is seen in Vol. 33 (supp.)
High Courts Crim. Rep. 59 (Nagoya High Court
1953) which stated: "It is obvious that the police should
make efforts to avoid the abuse of the provisions
... however, on the other hand it is likely that the
police are prone to be too timid with excessive fear of
the voice of protection of human rights... such will
lead to endangering the public welfare and the basis
of democracy .... "
3'Persons who need police protection, such as
insane or drunken persons, lost children, or sick or
wounded persons.
2 See Inbau, Restrictions in the Law of Investigation

and Confessions, 52 Nw. U. L. R. 80, 81 (1957).
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useless or even dangerous to relax the present
restrictions on arrest. Such a step would not only
infringe upon human rights but also hamper the
progress of police discipline. Despite the complaints made by the police about the strictness of
the present arrest statutes, most Japanese lawyers
appear to be content with the present status of the
law of arrest. Statistics show that 99.5% of applications for arrest warrants are granted by the
judge.- This seems to indicate that the judicial
control over arrest is not so strict as to hamper
police attempts to meet the public demand for
adequate police protection.
It was reported that in 1956 in Japan 136,488
suspects were prosecuted in formal proceedings.
91,699 or 67% of those accused had been arrested
for investigation, while only 44,789 or 33 % of them
had not been arrested.3 This statistical fact seems
to indicate that the arrest is still the beginning of
criminal investigation in Japan. However, this
phenomenon may be partially attributed to the
fact that in Japan there is no such system as
summons for the suspect. Because of the lack of a
summons system the police or prosecutors must
sometimes arrest those suspects who have committed minor offenses and have refused to report
at the investigators' office for questioning. This
practice apparently is one of the factors contributing to the increase in the arrest rate in Japan.
Introduction of a summons system is a measure
that should be seriously considered.
SOME MEASURES

AGAINST ILLEGAL ARREST BY.
THE POLICE wiTm SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO THE

COMPENSATION FOR THE SUSPECTED PERSON
PenalSanctions Against Illegal Arrest

In Japan, what penal deterrents to illegal arrest
practices by the police are used? In the first place,
attention should be drawn to the provisions of the
Penal Code 5 which are specifically designed to
deter government officials from engaging in uncivilized practices. 8 Under these provisions a police
officer who illegally arrests or imprisons a person
U ARREsT,

DETENTION

AND

RELEASE

ON

BAIL

47 (Yokogawa Ed., Tokyo, 1958) (in Japanese).
34Id. at 99.
,5 TnE PENAL CODE OF JAPAN, arts. 193-196.
3
6It should be noted that beside these specific
provisions there are general ones under which malfeasant officers are punished as ordinary persons. For
example, an illegal arrest or imprisonment is punished
by arts. 200 and 221; an officer who makes illegal
search and seizure is also liable for robbery (art. 236) or
larceny (art. 235).
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is punished by imprisonment with or without
forced labor for not more than ten years and not
less than six months 7
One might doubt the practicability of the enforcement of these provisions, because public
prosecutors may be reluctant to prosecute their
fellow investigators or may be influenced by
political pressure. Such apprehension, however, is
unfounded. The legislature has wisely set up a
safeguard against the possibility of unfair or
arbitrary dropping of cases. Under the Code of
Criminal Procedure a citizen who believes that his
accusation against a public officer for certain
crimes involving uncivilized practices has been
unreasonably turned down may have prompt
recourse to the judicial court which, in turn, may
order the public prosecutor to institute a prosecution against the public officer who allegedly exercised his authority in an illegal manner.1 In this
case the court must appoint an ad hoc public
prosecutor from among private practicing lawyers,
so that a fair and sincere prosecution may be
secured by this impartial prosecuting agency. This
special recourse is called "quasi public prosecution"
and has been taken rather frequently. It is reported that for the last decade (1949-1958) 624
persons including 132 police officers, 65 public
prosecutors, 36 judges and 391 others have been
brought before judicial courts pursuant to this
procedure for consideration as to whether they
should actually be prosecuted. 9
Civil Actions for Damages Caused by the Police
A citizen who has suffered from illegal arrest by
public officers has recourse to either of two types of
judicial remedy. First, he may bring an ordinary
civil suit against the public officers for damages
caused by the illegal arrest. Secondly, he may
institute a civil action against the State for
damages wrongfully caused by the arrest per-

Tim PENAL CODE oP JAPAN, art. 194.
38Tam CODE OF CRnm.AL PROcEDuRE,
37

arts. 262267.
32These figures were taken from the records kept
at the Criminal Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of
Justice. Of these 624 persons, only 5 persons were
actually prosecuted and tried on the grounds of their
brutality. In the five cases tried, four defendants were
found guilty and one case is still pending. The extremely
low percentage of cases actually prosecuted may
mean that this procedure is not used by those who
need its merit. The procedure has frequently been
misused as a political challenge. Those who are actually
suffering from the abuse of investigating authority are
often too ignorant or timid to take recourse to this
procedure.

formed by an investigating officer working within
the scope of his official duty. 0 The system of legal
aids in civil litigation applies equally to these
cases, so that even poor citizens may bring such
suits against investigating officers. Data .taken
from materials kept at the Ministry of Justice
show that for seven years, from October, 1947, to
April, 1954, 69 civil suits were brought against
the Government for damages wrongfully caused by
police officers and prosecuting officials.u
Insufficiency of the TraditionalRemedies
What has been explained might have created the
impression that Japanese citizens are well protected from illegal exercises of investigating
authority. But such an impression is rather delusive.
Unfortunately, many over-zealous investigators
pay little attention to civil rights of citizens. It
appears that even the penal sanction has very
limited value as a deterrent to investigating
officers. The fact that very few investigating
officials have been punished for abusing their
authority suggests the inefficacy of the penal
sanction. Moreover, Japan, where the level of
"legal consciousness" is not very high, has very
few citizens as brave as "Michael Kohlbaas" who
declared war on his Government in pursuit of his
personal rights. Even if a citizen be brave enough
to bring a civil suit against the Government, he
faces the difficult task of proving his case against
the Government. Everyone knows how hard it is
to collect sufficient pieces of evidence from the
stronghold of the Government to make a strong
case against it. It is also very difficult to prove such
mental elements as "malicious intent" or "negli40 Ile system of governmental liability is established 'by Tim CoNsrrrunoN or JAPAN, art. 17
which provides that "Every person may sue for redress
as provided by law from the State or a public entity,
in case he has suffered damage through illegal act of
any public official." Pursuant to this provision the
STATE LiAsrnncr LAW (Law No. 125; Oct. 27, 1947)
provides that the State or public entity is-primarily
liable for damages when a person's rights have been
violated by illegal governmental activity. However,
the law further provides that such liability exists only
act of the public official is
in the event that the illegal
due to his intent or negligence. This means that fault,
not risk, is the basis of state liability in Japan.
11This figure does not necessarily include the number
of cases involving illegal arrests by the police. On the
contrary, most of them are those involving brutality
allegedly inflicted by police officers or prosecuting
officials.
42
See Hirano, Control of Investigation by Exclusion
of Evidence, 7 KEmo ZASSHI (Jour. of Crim. Law)
165, 168, 172 n.2 (1957).
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gence" on the part of a govemment official. What,
then, is the remedy?
A Suggested Remedy- -State's Strict or Absolute
Liability
One possible suggestion for remedying this
situation would be to proceed a few steps toward
the system of State's strict or absolute liability.
If a highly organized modem State, a veritable
"Leviathan," happens to infringe upon individual
rights in exercising its investigating authority, it
should be only fair for the State to pay the damages
under certain conditions, whether or not the
officials, as the agents of the State, have caused
the damages intentionally or negligently. Theoretically, strict or absolute liability or "risk"
liability has little to do with illegal exercise of
public authority. However, we can hardly say
that the official exercised the public authority
illegally until or unless we succeed in proving that
he did so intentionally or negligently. Therefore,
substantially the system of State's strict or absolute liability is a substitute for ordinary litigation
for State's liability based upon intent or negligence
of public officials, because it allows the citizen to
dispense with proof of intent or negligence which is
otherwise indispensable to the recovery of damages
from the State. This system would be particularly
useful in the field of criminal investigation where
investigating officials are required to make speedy
and vigorous moves with high probability of
infringing upon citizens' rights.
An Experience in Japan-CriminalCompensation
Law
It would be of some interests to review the
progress which Japan has made in this direction in
recent years.
Under the "Criminal Compensation Law,"
which was originally enacted in 1933 and repealed
by the new law of the same title in 1950,4 an
accused who has been arrested or detained and
has been finally adjudged "not guilty" by the
court is entitled, under certain conditions, to be
awarded some flat compensation by the court.
The maximum amount of compensation is fixed at
400 yen per diem for the period of illegal restraint
of freedom. Although the amount of flat compensation is not sufficient for recovering damages ac3 Law No. 1, Jan. 1, 1950, repealing Law No. 60,
April 1, 1933.
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tually caused, the significance of this system should
not be underestimated."
One of the defects of this system, however, is
the point that the Criminal Compensation Law
does not cover the case involving a criminal suspect
who is arrested for investigation but eventually
discharged by the investigating officials.
Let us suppose, for example, that Mr. John Doe
was arrested while he was walking along Ginza
Street in Tokyo. His conscience was dear, but the
police had good reason for believing that he might
be the criminal being sought. After 24 hours of
investigation at the police station, he turned out to
be innocent and was released. In such a case, is he
entitled to compensation under the Criminal
Compensation Law? This answer is "No." He
can not sue for damages against the police because
there was no irregularity or fault on the part of the
police; nor is he entitled to compensation under
the Criminal Compensation Law because he was
not formally prosecuted as a criminal defendant.
"The following tables constructed from the data
provided by judicial statistics show how the Criminal
Compensation Law has been actually administered in
recent years. According to these statistics amount of
compensation per capita is 28,445 yen.
Table I. Criminal Compensation Cases
Finally Disposed Of
(196-1958)
Year

1956
1957
1958
Total

Compensation Granted

Total
cw
Considered

Grantees

Days
Day

279
184
133
596

271
161
126
558

26,093 6,622,670
15,514 3,838,367
18,326 5,411,550
59,933 15,872,587

Amount
'(en)

missed
isd
etc.

8
23
7
38

(Source: The Secretariat General, The Supreme
Court of Japan, Annual Report of Judicial Statistics,
2. Criminal Cases, Part II for 1956, '57 and '58)
Table I. Number of Persons Compensated as
Classified by Amount Granted Per Diem
Year

400 yen

399-300

2y2

00

Other

Total

271
1
154
75
41
(15.1%) (27.7%) (56.8%) (0.4%) (100%)
161
2
80
46
33
1957
(20.5%)1(28.6%)1(49.7%)1 (1.2%) (100%)
1956

(Source: Secretariat General, the Supreme Court
of Japan)
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The Birth of the Regulationfor Suspect's Compensatiol
Increasing criticism of such an unsatisfactory
situation stimulated the issuance of "the Regulation for Suspect's Compensation. 4 5 Under this
Regulation an amount not exceeding 400 yen per
diem may be paid to the suspect, under certain
conditions, in compensation for the mental pains
and property damage which he has suffered from
physical restraint pending criminal investigation,
in the event the real offender has been discovered
or the suspect has been finally found innocent
after a certain period of arrest or detention. In
this procedure the public prosecutor decides to
make such compensation upon the request of the
discharged suspect, but the request is not the
prerequisite for the compensation. In addition,
if the person compensated requests a public
notification that he was compensated, an account
to that effect must be published in the Official
Gazette or a newspaper for the rehabilitation of his
honor.
Theoretically, this compensation is of a gratuitous nature and the suspect is not entitled to take

45 MnasRY

op JusTicE, INsTucnoN No. 1 (1957).

recourse to the judicial court from the public
prosecutor's discretionary decision of not awarding
compensation. But, as a matter of practice, prosecutors have been rather generous in awarding
compensation pursuant to Article 1 of the Regulation providing that "this Regulation shall be
reasonably administered in the spirit of respecting
human rights and in accordance with individual
circumstances." Moreover, it is generally agreed
that the discharged suspect who is not content
with the decision made by a public prosecutor with
regard to the compensation may take a special
administrative appeal from this decision to the
hierarchical superior of the public prosecutor.
Thus far only a few persons have been compensated under this Regulation. 4 However, it appears
to be too early to decide whether this is due to the
fact that the system has not yet become familiar to
the people or to the fact that the arrest privilege of
the police has been exercised moderately.
46 From June, 1957, to February, 1960, fifteen cases
involving fifteen suspects arrested and detained were
considered for compensation under the Regulation.
Of the fifteen cases, thirteen were disposed of and
seven suspects were granted compensation. This data
was taken from the records kept at the Criminal Affairs
Bureau, Ministry of Justice.
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ANDERS BRATHOLM*

The power of the police in Norway to arrest
suspected persons is regulated by the Norwegian
Criminal Procedure Act of 1887.
The chief provisions are found in Chapter 19 of
the act. They may be divided into material and
formal prerequisites. The material prerequisites
deal with the requirements to be met as regards the
punishable act. The formal prerequisites refer to
the procedure to be followed when arrest is ordered.
The material prerequisites may be divided into
general and special prerequisites. Arrest may take
place only when the general and at least one of the
special conditions are present.
The chief general provision is found in Section
228(1). According to this provision the police can
arrest a person who, on reasonable grounds, is suspected of a punishable action for which the maxi-

mum statutory penalty is a term of imprisonment
longer than six months.
If the general conditions are satisfied, arrest may
take place when at least one of the following special conditions is met:
(1) The suspected person is seized in flagrante
delicto, or the traces of his action are fresh.
(2) There is reason to fear that he will flee to avoid
punishment.
(3) His conduct gives special reason to fear that he
will tamper with evidence.
(4) There is special reason to feat that he will repeat the punishable offence.
(5) The question will arise of application of security measures (that is, generally speaking, relatively indefinite measures in the case of recidivists).'

* Professor of Law, University of Oslo. Additional
biographical data may be found in 51 J. C1u16. L., C. &
P.S. 186.

I A more detailed statement of the prerequisites to
arrest and detention will be found in Bratholm, Arrest
and Detention in Norway, 108 U.PA.L.REv. 336 (1960).
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The police can, in certain cases, arrest a suspect
even if the maximum statutory penalty cannot exceed six months of imprisonment.
The most important of the provisions in this regard is Section 229 of the Criminal Procedure Act.
In this section it is laid down that arrest may be
made regardless of the weight of penalty when at
least one of these three special conditions is present:
(1) The suspected person is taken in flagrante delicto and does not desist from his punishable activity.
(2) He is found in the act of absconding or evidently preparing to abscond.
(3) He has no fixed address in the country, and
there is reason to fear that he will attempt to avoid
punishment.
The most important formal requirement is that
the police shall procure a warrant-that is, the
consent of a Magistrate-before the arrest is made.
But if the purpose of the arrest might be thwarted
by waiting, the arrest may be made without a warrant. In practice, however, it is very seldom that
the police do procure the consent of the court, even
in cases where there is ample time to do so. This
police practice was strongly criticised by the Supreme Court in a ruling of 1936; 2 however, this did
not have the effect of changing matters to any
significant degree.
It may be mentioned that the arrested persons in
the 1936 case were two well known Norwegian
lawyers who were suspected of financial crimes.
The charges were dropped on lack of evidence, and
the lawyers claimed and were awarded high damages under Section 469 of the Criminal Procedure
Act. According to this section, the State is responsible for the economic loss detention in custody
has caused the detained person, where there are
grounds for believing that he is innocent. This rule
applies even if nobody can be blamed for the detention of the innocent. 3
It is interesting to note that, after the Supreme
Court ruling in 1936, the police in Norway, as far
as possible, have avoided arresting a lawyer without having obtained a warrant in advance.
If the arrested person is not released the day
after his arrest, the police must bring him before
an examining judge with an application for com2 Norsk Retstidende (Nor. Law Rep.) 567 (1936).
3
Section 469 has also a rule according to which damages can be awarded an accused person who has not
been arrested or remanded in custody. However, in
these cases the court has a discretionary power to refuse
damages.
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mitment to custody.4 If the judge finds that the
general material conditions, and at least one of the
special conditions mentioned in Section 228(2)(5), or Section 229(2)-(3), exist (Sections 228(1)
and 229(1) only grant the power to arrest), he can
pronounce judgement that the arrested person
shall be detained in custody for a certain time. 5
We thus see that the conditions of arrest, as
well as of detention in custody, are carefully regulated by the Criminal Procedure Act. This is taken
to be a necessary consequence of Section 99 of the
Norwegian Constitution of 1814, which, inter alia,
lays down that arrest and imprisonment can only
take place as determined by the law and in the
manner prescribed by the law. This is one aspect
of the general principle of legality on which the
Norwegion Constitution is built and which demands that regulations that invade the sphere of
the rights of an individual shall in general have the
form of written law.
While this principle applies unimpaired as regards imprisonment as penalty, it is to a certain
extent neglected as far as arrest (and detention) is
concerned. 6 Thus it is quite common for the police
to halt and examine persons who are found in the
neighborhood of the place where a crime has just
been committed and who could be suspected of
being implicated in the crime or who could have
been witnesses of itj
It may be said that the right to halt and detain
for a short time can be justified by Section 333 of
the Norwegian Penal Code of 1902 which declares
it the duty of every person to give his name, position and address to a policeman who requests this
information in the public interest.8 The police
practice does not, however, involve merely halting
a person and requesting his name and address. He
may also be examined with respect to the crime or
searched without the full authority of the law. It
may be added that Norwegian criminals, as well
as the police, very seldom are armed, and frisking
for weapons does not often occur.
If the person who was questioned cannot give a
fully satisfactory account of himself, or if compromising articles are found on him, he generally will
4
CRnUNAL PRocEDuRE AcT (hereinafter called
CPA), §§235, 236.
6 CPA, §§240, 239.

6 For more detailed information than given in this
article,
see Bratholm, op.cit.supra note 1, at 343-47.
7
See BxATHOIe,

PAAGRIPEISE 00 VARETEKTSpENG-

(Arrest and Detention Before Trial) 9-10 (Oslo
1957).
8
Offences against §333 are punishable by a fine or
imprisonment for a term not exceeding three months.
SEL
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be taken to the police station for closer examination.
Especially in cases where a serious crime has
been committed (for example, murder) can the
police go to considerable lengths when it comes to
taking to the police station persons who might be
suspected of having had something to do with the
offence. Most of these are set free after a short
time-if, for example, their alibi is in order-but
in some cases they may be detained in police arrest
overnight. In such cases, where several persons are
detained as suspected of a crime which only one
single person can be imagined to have committed,
the terms of the Criminal Procedure Act, which demand that there shall exist reasonable grounds for
suspicion, will not be complied with, and the police
will therefore make no attempt to obtain
the court's ruling for detention. Only if special
reasons should be present for the belief that
one single individual among the suspects is guilty
will the person concerned be brought before the
court with application for remand in custody.
Such a check-up of a number of persons who can
be suspected of having had something to do with
the crime often permits the police to lay their
hands on the guilty party. The trial and error
method is fairly effective in Norway, where the
conditions are so uncomplicated that the police
can often point with considerable confidence to the
milieu within which the offender is to be found.
Furthermore, it is not only when it is known that
a crime has already been committed that the police
sometimes arrest persons on a vague suspicion.
Under other circumstances the police detain and
examine and, if necessary, take to the police station, persons whose conduct arouses suspicion.
Thus, some time ago, the police took a young man
to the police station who at a late hour of the night
was unable to give a satisfactory account of himself. The police had a strong impression that he had
stolen the bicycle which he had with him, but this
proved not to be the case. However, before they
had given the young man his liberty, a report came
in of a brutal sex murder that had been committed
in the neighborhood in which he had been arrested,
and further examination showed that the arrested
man was the criminal.
In this case it may well be said that a legally
most doubtful arrest led to the solution of one of
the most brutal murders committed in Norway
since the second world war. (It may be added that
a confession or other evidence obtained in con-

nection with an illegal arrest will not be excluded
during the trial.)
In such routine check-ups of suspected persons,
it is seldom necessary for the police to use force.
Those who have come under scrutiny nearly always
go willingly to the police station, because they
know that otherwise force will be used and that a
refusal will only aggravate suspicion against them.
I The police seldom designate persons who
are
arrested on a vague suspicion as "suspected" persons or "arrested" persons, but they are referred
to as "taken" or "brought in"-designations which
the law does not use.9 The same procedure is used
to some extent in Denmark.10
In spite of the terminology of the police, the suspected person in such cases must be considered as
arrested, and therefore he must also have the
rights of an arrested person. This means, among
other things, that he, like other accused persons,
cannot be punished for giving a false statement (as
can a witness). In a decision of the Supreme Court
in 1940 this was expressly laid down." The court
concluded that when a suspected person is more or
less expressly faced with the choice between voluntarily accompanying an officer to the police station and arrest, then from a legal point of view, he
must be considered as arrested.
The police practice which I have described here,
and which in certain cases undoubtedly lacks the
authority of the present law, and in other cases
must be said to lie on the borderline of legality, has
not to any great extent led to complaints from arrested persons or from other quarters. This is due
partly to the fact that the suspected persons as a
rule are not aware that the police are acting on the
borderline of their authority or even beyond it.
In this connection, it can be mentioned that persons who are arrested and detained at the police
station for a short period of tim4 seldom acquire
counsel, although they are entitled by the law to
to so on their own expense.U The deprivation of
9 See BPATom , op. cit. supra note 7, at 10.
10See HuRwrrz, DEN DANsKE STRAYFEREmPLEJE
648 (2d ed. Copenhagen 1949).
1 Norsk Retstidende (Nor. Law Rep.) 343 (1940);
PENAL CODE, §167. The terminology of the police may
in certain respects be of advantage to the suspect. Thus,
when he is considered as "taken in", he is not recorded
as arrested in the police-register.
1CPA, §99. In rare cases, counsel may be appointed
for the accused at public expense just after his arrest.
See CPA, §102, which prescribes that counsel shall be
appointed if it is considered necessary in view of the
nature of the case, provided that the accused has applied for appointment of counsel. If the defendant is
going to be tried, then he, as a rule, is entitled to counsel at public expense. See CPA, §§100, 101.
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liberty is so short in most cases that there is no
time to obtain legal assistance. Most of them,
therefore, do not know that the action of the police
can give rise to criticism.
Another reason why the doubtful police practice
has not led to complaint or public criticism to any
great extent is that most people realize that the
present police practice seldom goes beyond the
bounds of what may be called reasonable action.
It seems to be generally agreed that the current
provisions of law, which regulate the power of the
police to arrest suspected persons and which were
passed in a society quite different from the present
society, are somewhat too restricted and that they
should be revised so that the prevailing practice
would be to some degree legalized'
In this connection it can be mentioned that the
new Swedish law of procedure (1942) has legalized
the former Swedish police practice of bringing
persons to the police station for questioning, checkup, etc. Thus a person who has been on the spot
where a crime has been committed has a duty, if
requested by an officer, to accompany him to the
police station for questioning. If the person refuses without good reason, he can be compelled
to go with the officer."
1 For some suggestions for reform, see Bratholm, op.
cit. supranote 1, at 349-53.
14TIr SwEDLwI PlocEnuRE AcT or 1942, c. 23, §8.
The person can be kept at the police station for ques-
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Furthermore, the Swedish police can arrest a
suspected person, even if the suspicion is not
founded on reasonable grounds, as it must be in the
case of detention in custody. 5 The strength of suspicion consequently need not be so great in the
case of arrest as in case of detention. The same
16
applies in the case of Danish law.
The Norwegian Criminal Procedure Act is now
under revision, and there is much to be said for
Norwegian adoption of arrest provisions corresponding to those now existing in Sweden. The
objections against introducing such regulations
need hardly be very great, since the Norwegian
police, practically speaking, never behave brutally
towards suspected persons, and since the arrangement does not seem to be attended by serious
handicaps in any other way. It should, however,
be considered as a safeguard to introduce rules
which make it mandatory that the accused shall
be provided with counsel at public expense if he is
not released within a reasonable period (e.g., 24
hours) after his arrest 7
tioning for a period up to six hours, but if there is reason
to suspect him of a crime, up to twelve hours. If then
the suspicion does not appear strong enough to justify
his 5imprisonment, the police must set him free.
' Tur SwxmisH PRocEDm .E AcT oF 1942, c.24, §§5,
1.
I6TnE DAMNsE PaocEiua. AcT oF 1916, §§771, 780.
1"See Brathohm, op. cil. supra note 1, at 353.

